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DOES THE CHARTER MATTER?
Harry Arthurs and Brent Arnold*
This article investigates whether Canada
has changed in ways the ways that
proponents of the Charter desired and
anticipated. We examine the progress of
groups that the Charter was intended to
benefit (Aboriginal peoples, women,
visible minorities, and immigrants); areas
of state action that the Charter was
intended to regulate (the criminal process
and bureaucratic behaviour); and aspects
of our communal and public life that the
Charter was intended to animate and
enhance (politics and inter-group cultural
relations). We rely on a significant number
ofstudies of Canadian social development
during the periodfrom 1982 to the present.
Available evidence suggests that progress
towards the vision of Canada inscribed in
the Charter has generally been modest,
halting, non-existent, and, in some cases,
negative. What we claim is that the
Charter does not much matter in the
precise sense that it has not -for whatever
reason -sign ficantly altered the reality of
life in Canada.
Cet article examine si le Canada a changg
par rapport d ce que les auteurs de la
Charte voulaient et prvoyaient. Nous
otudions le progres des groupes que la
Charte devait avantager (Autochtones,
femmes, minorites visibles et immigrants),
les zones d 'action de l'Etat que la Charte
devait rigir (r~gime pinal et
comportement bureaucratique), ainsi que
des aspects de notre vie commune et
publique que la Charte devait animer et
amiliorer (politique et relations
culturelles intergroupes). Nous nousfions
un nombre important di'tudes sur le
d~veloppement social canadien pendant la
phriode allant de 1982 di aujourd'hui. Les
elgents depreuve disponiblesfontpenser
que le progris vers la vision du Canada
qui est inscrite dans la Charte a
gingralement iti modeste, hesitant, non
existant et, dans certains cas, n~gatif.
Nouspr~tendons que la Charte ne compte
pas vraiment dans le sens oi4 elle na pas
considgrablement modif6 [a r~aliti de la
vie au Canada.
In this article, we investigate whether it can be said that Canada
has changed in ways the ways that proponents of the Charter desired
and anticipated. We examine the progress of groups that the Charter
was intended to benefit (Aboriginal peoples, women, visible
minorities, and immigrants); areas of state action that the Charter
was intended to regulate (the criminal process and bureaucratic
behaviour); and aspects of our communal and public life that the
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Charter was intended to animate and enhance (politics and inter-
group cultural relations). We rely on a significant number of studies
of Canadian social development during the period from 1982 to the
present. Available evidence suggests that progress towards the vision
of Canada inscribed in the Charter has generally been modest,
halting, non-existent, and, in some cases, negative. What we claim
is that the Charter does not much matter in the precise sense that it
has not - for whatever reason - significantly altered the reality of life
in Canada.
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms' in 1982 marked a transformation in Canadian legal
doctrine, practice, and culture. Who would deny it? But did this legal
transformation in turn accomplish - or even coincide with -
measurable changes in the social and political life of Canada and
Canadians? The answer to this question is by no means clear. What
is clear, however, is that (for reasons we explore) there have been
surprisingly few attempts to investigate social data that might
provide an answer. We have shifted through a great deal of such
evidence covering the period from the enactment of the Charter to
the present.2 Our very tentative conclusion is that the Charter does
not in fact seem to have mattered very much in the sense that Canada
today differs in relevant respects only modestly, if at all, from
Canada as it was in 1982. We are much less tentative, however,
about our second and more important conclusion: Canadian
constitutional scholars ought to have asked the questions we have
raised, ought to have begun to develop the tools to answer those
questions, and, absent such tools, ought to be less celebratory or
condemnatory about Charter judgments, culture, and politics. In
other words, this essay is as much about the intellectual life of
Charter scholarship as it is about the Charter itself.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
2 Our initial research was completed in mid-2004 and has been selectively
updated to incorporate important data sources that became available prior to
October 2005. References in the text to "the Charter era" or "the past two
decades" cover the period from 1982 to 2005; specific dates are provided in
footnote references to "snapshot" studies that identify trends and
developments during those years.
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II. THE CHARTER: ASPIRATION, ACHIEVEMENT,
ASSESSMENT
The Charter has become a preoccupation of legal scholars3 and
appellate judges,4 and a staple of public law and criminal litigation
practices, although perhaps less so than of commercial or
conveyancing practices. Moreover, the Charter is generally
perceived to have redefined the roles and altered the fortunes of
various political actors and institutions, though precisely which and
how is a matter of controversy. Some contend that the Charter has
empowered rights-seeking citizens;5 others that it has favoured
corporations,6 a "Court Party" of identity-based groups,7 or the
3 A survey of Canadian full-time law school faculty members found that 35
percent indicated a teaching and/or research interest in constitutional law
including the Charter, the most frequently indicated area of interest; four of
the top five areas of research interest were related to constitutional law. See
Department of Justice Canada, Research Report: Canadian Law School
Faculty Survey Prepared by Anna Paletta, Christopher Blain & Daniel
Antonowicz (Ottawa: Canadian Council of Law Deans and Research and
Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada 2000) at 3-5. See also
Theresa Shanahan, Legal Scholarship: An Analysis of Law Professors'
Research Activities In Ontario's English-speaking Common Law Schools
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 2002) [unpublished] at 203-204 and
Appendix D [Shanahan]. Quicklaw's online 'JOUR' database for articles
containing "Charter" in the title or in any field retrieved 303 results. This
database includes thirty-seven academic journals and collections of research
papers, plus twenty-two legal newsletters, but not specialist constitutional
journals such as the National Journal of Constitutional Law or the Review of
Constitutional Studies. Only a few publications contain references dating back
to 1986; most date back only as far as the early to mid-1990s; some go only
as far back as 2000. The total number of scholarly publications concerned with
the Charter is therefore seriously understated, even more so when publications
on the constitution in general are included.
4 The Ontario Court of Appeal alone decided 167 Charter-related cases over the
2000-2002 period (6 percent of its 3,702 reported and unreported decisions),
while the Supreme Court of Canada decided ninety such cases (28 percent of
its 253 decisions). Quicklaw online database.
5 Lorraine E. Weinrib, "The Supreme Court of Canada in the Age of Rights:
Constitutional Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Under
Canada's Constitution" (2001) 80 Canadian Bar Rev. 699 [Weinrib].
6 Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights & the Legalization of Politics in
Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1994)
[Mandel]; Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics
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courts themselves.8 The consequences of these changes for Canada's
political processes are also debatable. Has the Charter launched a
constructive dialogue between courts and legislatures9 or
undermined electoral democracy? ° Has it reinforced social
movements" or promoted identity politics? 2 Has it become a
symbolic rallying point for Canadian patriotism 3 or exacerbated
with Little Class" (1992) 1 Social and Legal Studies 45.
7 F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000).
8 Allan Hutchinson, Reading Between the Lines: Courts and Constitutions
(2002) (unpublished; on file with the authors].
9 Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts
and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing
After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law J. 75.
10 A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and
Political Life of Canada (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1994)
[Bogart, Courts and Country].
" Weinrib, supra note 5; Miriam Catherine Smith, Lesbian and Gay Rights in
Canada: Social Movements and Equality-Seeking, 1971-1995 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999).
12 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
13 A recent commentary argues that "the Charter can be understood as the
capstone of an institutional process that has helped to raise the intensity-level
of Canadian nationalism as a whole." John Wright, Gregory Millard & Sarah
Riegel, "Here's Where We Get Canadian: English-Canadian Nationalism and
Popular Culture" (2002) 32:1 The American Review of Canadian Studies 11.
The authors point out that "[a] number of observers have noted how the
Charter has strengthened Canadians' sense of identification with their
constitution," citing as examples Alan C. Cairns, Disruptions: Constitutional
Struggles from the Charter to Meech Lake, ed. Douglas E. Williams (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1991) [Cairns, Disruptions]; Alan C. Cairns,
Charter Versus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992); and Alan
C. Cairns, Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional
Change, ed. Douglas E. Williams (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc.); as
well as Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Be a
Sovereign People? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); and David
Milne, The Canadian Constitution (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co. 1991),
especially Chapter 8. Michael Bliss is more expansive in arguing that "by the
end of the century... it was clear that Trudeau's vision of a pluralistic society
of free men and women, as expressed in the Charter and evolving
multiculturalism, had become the Canadian state's core value. His very spirit
had become the essence of his country." Michael Bliss, "Citizen Trudeau"
Time (Canadian Edition) 156:15 (9 October 2000) 20. An earlier evaluation
Vol. 11, No. 1
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regional, social, religious, and linguistic conflict? 4 Has it become a
strategy of last resort for groups denied access to the political
process"5 or a first principle shaping the behaviour of all political
actors and institutions? 6 Public attitudes towards the Charter and its
custodians - judges and lawyers - exhibit similar ambiguities. On
the one hand, two decades-worth of Charter good works by judges
and lawyers has not much improved their reputation, 7 nor has it
persuaded Canadians that courts should displace legislators as the
authors of public policy. On the contrary, a significant majority (54
held that "the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms must be regarded as a
manifesto of Canadian nationalism rather than a symbol of the triumph of
liberal individualism." Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian
Dream (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995) at 136, cited in
David Taras, "Mass Media Reporting of Canadian Supreme Court Decisions:
Mapping the Terrain" (2000) 25:3 Canadian Journal of Communication 397.
14 David Abraham, "Citizenship Solidarity and Rights Individualism: On the
Decline of National Citizenship in the U.S., Germany, and Israel" (2002),
online: The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies <http://www.ccis-
ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg53.PDF>.
1 Carl F. Stychin, A Nation by Rights: National Cultures, Sexual Identity
Politics, and the Discourse ofRights (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1998).
16 Mandel, supra note 6.
17 The percentage of those who have high or moderate confidence in judges and
lawyers has not changed significantly over almost twenty years. The figures
stood at 15.2 percent (high) and 57.7 percent (moderate) in 1983 and at 18.2
percent and 53.1 percent, respectively, in 2001. The moderate category has
consistently comprised the vast majority of respondents and has never dipped
below 45.3 percent. Canadian Opinion Research Archive, Kingston, Ontario,
"Confidence: Judges and Lawyers" (20 January 2003), online: Canadian
Opinion Research Archive, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario
<http://www.queensu.ca/cora/trends/tables/ConfidenceJudges&Lawyers.
htm>. However, given the public's well-known mistrust of lawyers, it is
reasonable to assume that support for judges alone might be higher than these
statistics suggest. While historical data is unavailable from the same source,
an Ipsos-Reid/CTV/Globe and Mail poll from 2001 noted that, although 50
percent of Canadians believed that "some Supreme Court rulings are
influenced by partisan politics," 91 percent of Canadians had a "great deal or
a fair amount of respect for the Canadian judiciary," and 88 percent had "a
great deal or a fair amount of respect specifically for the Supreme Court
bench." These results compared favourably with U.S. results holding that 85
percent of Americans have "a great deal or a fair amount of respect" for their
own Supreme Court. Kirk Makin, "Canadians Feel Supreme Court Tainted by
Partisan Politics" The Globe and Mail (3 July 2001) A1, A4.
2005
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percent) believes that judges have too much power. 8 However,
Canadians do seem to be exceedingly positive about the Charter -
in principle at least.'9 They exhibit a considerable appetite for media
coverage of Charter-related issues,20 they maintain a decent regard
for jurists as compared to "government" in general,2 and they accept
that judges must make legally binding decisions that give effect to
the constitution - including the Charter.22 In what sense, then, are we
18 Ipsos-Reid poll July 2003, cited in Jeff Sallot, "Public Against Judges Making
Laws, Poll Says" The Globe and Mail (11 August 2003) A5 [Ipsos-Reid].
19 "Eighty-eight percent of Canadians have heard of the Charter, and the same
number say it is a good thing for the country. Only 4 percent say the Charter
is a bad thing for Canada. Approval is growing: among those who have heard
of the Charter, 92 percent say it is a good thing - a 10-point increase over
1987 and 1999." Centre for Research and Information on Canada, "The
Charter: Dividing or Uniting Canadians?" (April 2002), online:
<http://www.cric.ca/pdf/cahiers/cricpapersapril2002.pdf> at 8. While support
for the Charter is clearly broad - it is "viewed favourably by large majorities
in all regions" and as of 2002 was "higher than in previous years" - the same
study suggests that this support may not be 'deep,' inasmuch as there are
significant differences in public opinion regarding the actual content or
significance of Charter rights. For instance, 54 percent oppose the existence
of the "notwithstanding" clause, while 41 percent support it, suggesting a
significant split on the fundamental issue of paramountcy of elected bodies
versus paramountcy of the country's supreme law; in addition, 56 percent
support greater police powers to fight crime even at the expense of civil rights,
while 41 percent are opposed, at 2.
20 A search for "Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in the Canadian Index, an
online database available to Canadian university researchers encompassing
"Canadian journals, magazines, newspapers and business sources" with
coverage from 1982 to 2003, retrieved fully 2,658 results. Of these, 308 were
for articles or news stories published in 2003; 460 were published in 2002. A
similar search of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's online archives
produced 482 results dating only as far back as 1999. Presumably a
specialized search of terms related to topics and groups affected by Charter
rulings - criminal justice, gays and lesbians, women, unions - would turn up
additional references.
21 Those with "a lot" of confidence in government in general between 1983 and
1995 never amounted to more than 6.9 percent (in 1985) and those with even
a "fair" amount peaked at 51.8 percent (also in 1985) and by 1995 had
dwindled to 33.8 percent (compared to judges' and lawyers' 46 percent).
Queen's University Canadian Opinion Research Archive, "Confidence:
Government" (30 August 2003), online: <http://www.queensu.ca/cora/trends/
tables/Confidence-Government.htm>.
2 Ipsos-Reid, supra note 18.
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we asking "does the Charter matter?" The original promise of the
Charter was made not only to academics, judges, legal practitioners,
and political actors,23 but ostensibly to all Canadians:
We must now establish [said Prime Minister Trudeau in 1981] the basic
principles, values and beliefs which hold us together as Canadians so that
beyond our regional loyalties there is a way of life and a system of values
which make us proud of the country which has given us such freedom and
such immeasurable joy.
24
This was also the expectation of at least some scholarly, judicial, and
professional commentators who predicted that "the Charter will
fundamentally change the Canadian political system and the very
identity of the Canadian citizenry, ' ,2' and that its guarantees would
23 Joel Bakan notes that enactment of the Charter "was widely celebrated by
social activists and equality seeking groups. They saw the Charter as a vehicle
for advancing social justice and equality." Joel Bakan, "What's Wrong with
Social Rights?" [Bakan, "Social Rights"] in Joel Bakan & David
Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitution: Perspectives on a
Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992) 85 at 85
[Bakan & Schneiderman]. Among other things, "[i]t was claimed that, as an
enforceable statement of values and aspirations, the Charter would help
emancipate Canadians and, by increasing their political power, give them a
stronger voice in their society." Harry Glasbeek, "The Social Charter: Poor
Politics for the Poor" in Bakan & Schneiderman, ibid. at 116 [Glasbeek,
"The Social Charter"].
24 Statement inscribed on copies of the Charter widely distributed by the federal
government following its formal adoption by in 1982. This statement is also
excerpted on the Government of Canada's website celebrating the twentieth
anniversary of s. 15 of the Charter: see Government of Canada, Department
of Justice, "Equality: The Heart of a Just Society" (28 October 2005), online:
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/s 15/dinstrument.html> [Department of Justice].
The new constitution, Charter included, was first introduced in Parliament in
November of the previous year: House of Commons Debates, 12 (20
November 1981) at 13013 (Hon. Jean Chretien).
25 Alan C. Cairns, "An Overview of the Trudeau Constitutional Proposals" in
Cairns, Disruptions (supra note 13) 58 at 62. Justice Thomas Berger described
the Charter as "a valuable and uniquely Canadian undertaking" which would
serve as "Canada's contribution to evolving notions of liberal democracy and
political pluralism." Thomas R. Berger, "Towards the Regime of Tolerance"
in Stephen Brooks, ed., Political Thought in Canada: Contemporary
Perspectives (Toronto: Irwin Publishing Inc., 1984) 83 at 83 [Berger]. Even
those writing in the mainstream legal literature, generally more circumspect
in their assessments than their social science peers, were optimistic: "[a]n
entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms should ensure that fundamental
2005
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"offer minorities a place to stand, ground to defend, and the means
for others to come to their aid."2 6 It is therefore appropriate to ask
whether "the basic principles, values, and beliefs" proclaimed by the
Charter have indeed been "established" in any practical sense,
whether a new national pride has emerged "beyond regional
loyalties," whether our political system has "fundamentally changed"
for the better, and whether minorities' newly defined "place to
stand" has in some tangible way enhanced their communal identity
and dignity or the social and economic conditions of their members.
These are difficult questions to answer: first, because of a
fundamental ambiguity about what we mean when we speak of the
Charter; second, because such questions are seldom asked; and third,
because when they are, inappropriate or incomplete strategies are
employed to probe for answers. We address each of these difficulties
in turn.
What is the Charter? It is both an aspirational statement about the
fundamental values that ought to define Canada as a polity and a
rights and freedoms will not be set aside by a transient majority .... [T]he
Charter should also promote national unity by defining the common threads
that bind us together." J.-G. Castel, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1983) 61:1 Canadian Bar Rev. 1 at 1-2. Justice David C.
McDonald testified to the Charter's pervasiveness a mere two months after
its signing into law: "The Charter is like an incoming tide. It flows over our
plains and forests and into our own streets, our homes, our police stations, our
seats of government and our courts. It cannot be held back." Mr. Justice David
C. McDonald, "Notes for Overview - Introductory Remarks" in Gerald L.
Gall & Legal Education Society of Alberta & Canadian Institute for the
Administration of Justice, eds., Charting the Charter: Papers Prepared for
Seminar Jointly Sponsored by the Legal Education Society ofAlberta and the
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice for Presentation in
Calgary June 15, 1982, and Edmonton June 16, 1982 (Calgary: Legal
Education Society of Alberta, 1982) 1 at 5. Prime Minister Trudeau, speaking
of the draft Charter, boasted confidently that "[i]t will confer power on the
people of Canada, power to protect themselves from abuses by public
authorities.... Equal treatment for all, without discrimination due to sex,
colour, or origin, will be enshrined." Canada, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott
Trudeau, Statement by the Prime Minister, Ottawa, October 2. 1980 on the
Constitution (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 1980) at 6.
26 Berger, ibid. at 96.
Vol. 11, No. 1
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symbolic projection of those values.27 It is an operational blueprint
for relations between citizens and the state as well as among state
institutions and agencies.28 And it is a juridical text - Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982 - that comprises "the supreme law of
Canada" and renders "of no force and effect" inconsistent legislation
and executive action,29 if not necessarily judge-made law.30 Each of
these different Charters acquires different meanings, excites
different expectations, engages different constituencies, evokes
different responses, and implicates different social outcomes. Of
course, in asking "does the Charter matter?" in the context of a legal
publication, we place particular emphasis on the effects (including
non-effects and perverse effects) of the juridical Charter - the
Charter of lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and litigants. However,
the aspirational and relational Charters exhibit effects (including
non-effects and perverse effects) that are at least as significant. We
will note these as well, where appropriate.
This emphasis on the juridical Charter poses a special analytical
problem that is captured by the confession of one legal scholar that
the twentieth anniversary of the Charter in 2002 evoked in her
sentiments of "equivocation and celebration."3 Others might
characterize their feelings as "disappointment" or even, in Prime
Minister Trudeau's phrase, "immeasurable joy."32 While such
responses suggest that the Charter does indeed "matter" to the legal
actors who work with it on a daily basis, their reactions are decidedly
juridico-centric. Thus, all of the contributions to the Osgoode Hall
Law Journal's 2002 symposium issue, devoted to assessing the
Charter's legacy,33 evaluated the impact of the Charter by
27 See Jeremy Webber, "Constitutional Poetry: The Tension Between Symbolic
and Functional Aims in Constitutional Reform" (1999) 21:2 Sydney Law Rev.
260.
28 Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community and
the Canadian Constitution (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1994).
29 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.I lat s. 52(1) [Constitution Act, 1982].
30 Charter, supra note 1. See Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
Local 580 [R. W.D.S.U.] v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
31 Diana Majury, "The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and
Celebration" (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law J. 297.
32 Department of Justice, supra note 24.
33 (2002) 40:3 Osgoode Hall Law J.
2005
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examining the case law generated by it or by focussing on the court's
philosophy, logic, or doctrine in specific areas of law. Absent from
this symposium, and from virtually all Charter scholarship over the
past twenty-odd years, has been any empirical examination of its
concrete, real-life effects as experienced by its intended
beneficiaries. Even when, occasionally, quantitative methodologies
are employed, it is legal behaviours and outcomes that are generally
quantified, not the social phenomena that are, supposedly, their
ultimate consequence and justification. Thus, decisions are tallied
according to given categories of outcomes:34 the Charter-friendliness
of specific judges and courts3" or the win/lose record of particular
groups of litigants. 6 The focus of scholarship, in other words, has
been primarily on the status and well-being of Charter rights, not of
the rights-holders themselves. Empirical measurement is mobilized
to assess particular features of the litigation process rather than to
evaluate its social consequences. The reaction of even scholarly legal
actors to the Charter is thus informed by a skewed, not to say self-
regarding, perspective on whether the Charter "matters."
However, the same might be said about most evaluative questions
posed to legal practitioners, functionaries, judges, and academics. As
revealed by Law and Learning,3 7 a comprehensive report on legal
3 See e.g., F. L. Morton, Peter H. Russell & Michael J. Withey, "Judging the
Judges: The Supreme Court's First One Hundred Charter Decisions" in Paul
W. Fox & Graham White, eds., Politics: Canada, 7th ed. (Toronto: McGraw
Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1991) 59; Cynthia L. Ostberg, "Charting New Territory?
Fifteen Years of Search and Seizure Decisions by the Supreme Court of
Canada, 1982-1997" (2000) 30:1 American Review of Canadian Studies 35;
and James B. Kelly, "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997" (1999) 37
Osgoode Hall Law J. 625.
35 F. L. Morton, Peter H. Russell & Troy Riddell, "The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-
1992" (1994) 5 National J. Of Constitutional Law 1 [Morton, Russell &
Riddell]
36 See e.g., F. L. Morton & Avril Allen, "Feminists and the Courts: Measuring
Success in Interest Group Litigation in Canada" (2001) 34 Canadian J. of
Political Science 55.
37 To make full disclosure, Harry Arthurs, one of the authors of this article, was
chair and principal author of this report, Law and Learning: Report to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council by the Consultative Group
on Research and Education in Law (Ottawa: Social Science and Humanities
Research Council of Canada, 1983), though not of the Research Reports that
Vol. 11, No. 1
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research and education prepared and issued more or less
contemporaneously with the adoption of the Charter, the dominant
paradigms of Canadian legal research in the early 1980s were
doctrinal and theoretical. The principal object of scrutiny was legal
texts; few legal scholars used empirical or other social science
methodologies, and even fewer were trained to use them. While
Canadian legal scholarship has no doubt advanced some distance
beyond the modest ambitions of that period (in part stimulated by the
Charter, it must be said), it has not yet accepted the need to put
law's claims routinely and rigorously to the test." While more
Canadian legal scholars now have doctoral degrees, more have
training in the social sciences, and more are interested in what such
research might tell us, studies of law's causes and consequences are
still relatively rare. For example, a recent study of legal academics
showed that only 3 percent were engaged in empirical research of
any description. 39 True, for some twenty years the Canadian Journal
of Law and Society has published studies of legal institutions and
processes that are informed by social science methodologies
including (but by no means restricted to) empirical methodologies.
Other Canadian legal periodicals also do so, and important
qualitative assessments of legal phenomena have been undertaken in
reports and monographs. But empirical studies of constitutional law
- arguably the cornerstone of any legal system - are rare indeed,
both in Canada and in other countries.4 ° This is not to deprecate other
methodologies. They may, of course, yield important insights and
they have been utilized by scholars to ask questions about the impact
of the Charter that could not be pursued by examining conventional
provided evidence for its conclusions. See Alice Janisch, Profile ofPublished
Legal Research: A Report to the Consultative Group on Research and
Education in Law based on a survey of Canadian Legal Publications and John
S. McKennirey, Canadian Law Professors: A Report to the Consultative
Group on Research and Education in Law based on the 1981 survey offull-
time law professors in Canada (Ottawa: Social Science and Humanities
Research Council of Canada, 1982).
38 For differing views see Symposium Issue: The Arthurs Report on Law and
Learning 1983-2003 (2003) 18:1 Canadian J. of Law & Society.
39 Shanahan, supra note 3 at 204.
40 A leading American example is Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can
Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993)
[Rosenberg]. For a review of the literature, see Idit Kostiner, "Evaluating
Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social
Change" (2003) 37 Law & Society Rev. 323 [Kostiner].
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decisional materials.' Still, empirical evidence does offer an
important way of confirming, challenging, or amending findings
concerning the effects of the Charter based on more impressionistic
approaches. That is why it is surprising, for example, that Canada's
National Journal of Constitutional Law, founded in 1991, has yet to
publish a single empirical study of the social consequences of
constitutional litigation.42 Nor do such studies abound elsewhere in
the literature of constitutional scholarship. Indeed, William Bogart's
Courts and Country and his more recent Consequences: The Impact
of Law and Its Complexity43 represent two of the very few Canadian
attempts to assess such consequences, either in the constitutional
field or more generally. ' An examination of his work may help to
explain why other scholars have hesitated to embark on similar
endeavours.
Ill. HOW WOULD WE KNOW IF THE CHARTER
MATTERS AND WHY SHOULD WE WISH TO?
In Courts and Country, Bogart notes the difficulty of measuring
the impact of litigation and, especially, of disaggregating its effects
from those of other societal developments and state interventions.
Moreover, he continues, compliance with court rulings is highly
variable and their effects are often indirect and sometimes
unintended.45 And, he concludes, even assuming litigation effects
41 See e.g., Mandel, supra note 6; Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights
and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
42 It has published several empirical studies. On Charter related topics. See e.g.
F.L. Morton & Ian Brodie, "The Use of Extrinsic Evidence in Charter
Litigation before the Supreme Court of Canada" (1993) 3 National J. of
Constitutional Law 1; Morton, Russell & Riddell, "A Descriptive Analysis,"
supra note 35. However, while such studies provide statistically-based
descriptions of court procedures and decisions, they make no attempt to assess
their ultimate social effects.
43 Bogart, Courts and Country, supra note 10; W.A. Bogart, Consequences: The
Impact of Law and Its Complexity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002) [Bogart, Consequences].
4 Michael Mandel's 1994 effort provides another notable exception, though
empirical effects form just one aspect of a larger argument about the impact
of the Charter on Canadian politics. Supra note 6.
45 See also Jeremy Webber, "Tales of the Unexpected: Intended and Unintended
Consequences of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1993) 5:2
Canterbury Law Rev. 207.
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could be clearly identified, there is no "objective" method of
assessing their costs and benefits." Nonetheless - drawing on Gerald
Rosenberg's controversial book The Hollow Hope - Bogart is
willing to concede that, in principle and under specified conditions,
courts may be "effective causes of significant change. 47 Not
surprisingly, he reminds us, such conditions are rarely encountered.
In Consequences, Bogart aspires to a more empirically grounded
account of the effects of law. While the paucity of Canadian legal
impact studies forces him to treat experience with our Charter
largely as counterpoint to Rosenberg's study of American Bill of
Rights litigation, which draws upon a rather more extensive body of
socio-legal scholarship, this is by no means the only difficulty
identified by Bogart. Indeed, he catalogues the conceptual and
methodological difficulties that bedevil all attempts to assess the
impact of law, in general, and of constitutional litigation, in
particular.48 To begin, defining the "problem" for which a law or
legal ruling is required or desired is a politically charged and value-
laden task.49 To argue that particular outcomes are produced or
caused by, or even related to, a specific statute, court ruling, or
administrative intervention requires that: (i) "the types of influence
and their relationships ... be indicated clearly," (ii) "the evidence
that could substantiate these sources and connections . . . be
ascertained," and (iii) "all other possible explanations for the change
46 Bogart, Courts and Country, supra note 10 at 46-49.
47 Rosenberg, supra note 40 (as summarized here by Bogart in Courts and
Country) suggests that court decisions will be influential when: (1) there is
ample legal precedent for change; (2) there is support for change from
substantial numbers in the Congress and from the executive; and (3) there is
either support from some citizens or at least minimal opposition from all
citizens and (a) positive incentives are offered to induce compliance, or (b)
costs are imposed to induce compliance, or (c) court decisions allow for
market implementation, or (d) key administrators and officials are willing to
act and see court orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources or for
hiding behind. Bogart, Courts and Country, ibid. at 51. However, says Bogart,
Rosenberg concludes through a number of case studies in the U.S. that "courts
can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform" and that,
while he found no evidence of decisions mobilizing social reform (in Bogart's
paraphrase) "litigation may actually galvanize opponents who are already very
aware of the issues and related developments." Ibid. at 55.
See generally, Bogart, Consequences, supra note 43.
49 Ibid. at 84-86.
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other than the law being examined.., be explored and evaluated."5
This last requirement appears particularly difficult to satisfy, as
myriad factors are capable of generating "plausible rival
hypotheses."'" Optimally, of course, impact studies would be
designed in advance, to test controlled legal "experiments" in
"multiple time series" in which the effects of law are assessed across
several similar jurisdictions (some of which have enacted the law in
question, others of which have not and serve as controls) at several
time points in time.52 Unfortunately, Bogart notes, this ideal situation
is seldom available, and studies must therefore often "be done in
some compromised fashion."53 The importance of determining the
effect of laws, he suggests, is only reinforced by the frequency with
which their most dramatic consequences turn out to have been
unintended. 4
Fully conscious, then, of the difficulties entailed in any attempt
to gauge the impact of the Charter, we have set ourselves a
somewhat different question. That question derives from the often-
euphoric and -overstated claims of those who conceived,
promulgated, embraced, and used the Charter. Those claims come
down to this: that adoption of the Charter would effect significant
improvement in the individual and collective lives of Canadians; that
equality rights would improve the life chances of members of the
groups named in section 15 (and, as we now know with hindsight, of
"analogous groups"); that the rights guaranteed to Aboriginal
peoples and linguistic and cultural minorities - both under section 15
and elsewhere in the Constitution Act, 1982 - would enable them to
enjoy a less precarious and more complete communal existence; that
legal rights were enumerated with some specificity so that no one
who confronts the coercive power of the state - exercised by the
police, public agencies, and civil servants - need fear abusive or
illegal treatment; that fundamental freedoms and democratic rights
would promote and protect a more robust Canadian political culture;
and that even the relatively anemic and anomalous guarantees of
mobility rights would ensure that Canadians could come and go
more freely without having to risk their human capital or social
entitlements.
'o Ibid. at 91-92.
"' Ibid. at 93-94.
12 Ibid. at 98.
s3Ibid. at 99.
Ibid. at 99-109.
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Against this background, then, we pose the questions that animate
this study: Does the Charter matter? Is Canada a more equal country
than it was in 1982? Are Canadians less likely to encounter abuse
at the hands of the state? Has the communal life of Aboriginal
peoples and linguistic minorities been enhanced? Is our political
culture more robust? Is it easier for us to cross international and
provincial boundaries? Or is the contrary true? Have inequalities
proliferated and intensified? Are police and welfare officers more
abusive? Is communal life more impoverished? Is the quality of
political debate more anemic? Do we encounter more obstacles when
we cross borders? And not least: Why have Charter scholars been so
seldom tempted to answer these questions - or even to ask them?
These are complicated questions. Most of them, frankly, cannot
be answered. For reasons elaborated by Bogart, qualitative
judgments - what constitutes a robust political culture, for example
- depend on carefully defined benchmarks, but definitions are not
easily agreed-upon. Quantitative judgments, as he notes, depend on
longitudinal studies - of, say, the number of police assaults on
citizens in 1982 and 2005, or the widening or narrowing of the wage
gap between otherwise comparable workers of different ethnic or
racial groups - but few such longitudinal studies exist. Worse yet:
assuming benchmarks can be agreed, and studies undertaken, the
issue of causation seems almost irresolvable. If there are fewer (or
more) police assaults, is that because of the Charter or because of
better (or worse) training or discipline, greater (or diminished) fear
of tort claims by victim, changes in the demography of the police
force or of those arrested, or the effect upon Canadian police and
popular sensibilities of American television dramas? If gays and
lesbians enjoy greater dignity and suffer less discrimination in the
workplace or in their legal and social entitlements, is this a triumph
for the Charter, or is it attributable to social and cultural changes,
including some changes that high-profile Charter litigation may have
helped to publicize? Or have other legal regimes such as human
rights commissions and tribunals actually done the heavy lifting with
more frequent and more practical interventions? Have similar or
greater changes occurred in other countries that are comparable to
Canada but have no Charter or equivalent legal regime? Finally,
evidentiary issues and issues of causation aside, serious issues of
periodicization arise. Why, after all, should we confine our inquiries
to the period during which the Charter has been in force?
Conceivably, extending our inquiries to an earlier period might
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reveal that the Charter - far from bringing about social or legal
transformations - merely codified, ratified, or legitimated tendencies
and processes under way for decades. And if we could look into the
future, would we find that famous Charter victories - whether in
courts of law or of public opinion- did not in the long term actually
achieve the anticipated positive outcomes because their holdings
were narrowed by a new, less bold generation of judges; because
further reflection revealed flaws in the original holding; or because
supervening political, economic, or social developments frustrated
implementation of judicial remedies?
It is hugely difficult, then, to know whether the Charter matters.
But it can hardly be irrelevant. If, as a society, we are asked to invest
considerable financial resources, institutional energies, intellectual
effort, and moral credibility in important public policy initiatives -
in health care, education, policing, auto safety, labour and
environmental standards, and even culture - we ought ideally to
begin by asking: What is it we are attempting to achieve, and is this
new initiative likely to achieve it? And after more than two decades,
hopefully sooner, we would surely revisit the program in order to
undertake a cost-benefit analysis, however imperfect. Of course, that
is an idealized version of the way in which public policy is made. Of
course, emotive and symbolic arguments, special pleading,
entrenched interests, unshakeable prejudices, coincidence,
opportunism, and sheer inertia are often more powerful determinants
of public policy than informed calculations of efficacy. But that does
not mean that they are appropriate determinants.
If it could be shown that the Charter does not matter, that it is not
accomplishing what it was intended to, would that not be a good
reason for rethinking the whole enterprise? Perhaps some might
propose - as did Mao Zedong on the effects of the French
Revolution - that it is too soon to tell. This is a sensible response,
but it implies that at some future date the question should be asked
and answered. Perhaps some might argue that, even if it does no
good, at least the Charter - unlike, say, rent control or public
education - does no harm. This too may be a sensible response, but
it treats the absence of harm as a factual conclusion, rather than as a
hypothesis to be investigated. Perhaps some might argue that the
good that the Charter accomplishes is non-quantifiable, that it
becomes manifest not primarily in measurable outcomes produced
by explicit legal commands, but more subtly and symbolically by
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transforming our fundamental values, our comprehension of relations
between citizens and the state, and our grammar of civic discourse.
This may be the most sensible and sophisticated response of all. But
to accept it at face value is to rely on a map of society that locates
law at the centre ("the rule of law"), assigns the material forces of
political economy to the periphery, ascribes great symbolic and
didactic powers to legal institutions and actors, but, oddly, disavows
precisely the characteristic of law that is conventionally thought to
distinguish it from other normative systems: its ability to mobilize
the coercive power of the state. This, to put it unkindly, but not
unfairly, is a map drawn by lawyers. It is therefore subject to obvious
frailties.
We do not rely on such a map. Our ambition is not to show that
the Charter has in fact produced (or failed to produce) specific
outcomes. It is simply to investigate whether it can be said that
Canada has changed in ways the ways that proponents of the Charter
desired and anticipated. We have examined a significant number of
studies of Canadian social development during the period from 1982
to the present, most of which were not prepared with a view to
proving or disproving any particular hypothesis about the Charter.
These studies, taken individually, have many obvious flaws: few
precisely bracket the two decades under review, most reflect the
particular professional or personal preoccupations of their authors or
sponsors, some suffer from methodological flaws, and others lack
clear-cut conclusions. Our summaries doubtless fail to do some of
them justice and we do not claim to have exhausted all original
sources, even though we have tried to be fairly comprehensive in our
use of secondary materials. However, taken collectively, we do
believe we are proffering some of the best evidence available about
the extent to which Canadians during the Charter era have become
more equal; more politically engaged; more comfortably ensconced
within minority communities, cultures, and language groups; more
mobile; and more justifiably confident of proper treatment by police
and bureaucrats.
To anticipate our findings, available evidence suggests that
progress towards the vision of Canada inscribed in the Charter has
generally been modest, halting, non-existent, and, in some cases,
negative. And to anticipate objections to those findings, we neither
assert nor deny that these disappointments might be attributable to
any or all of: inherent defects in the Charter; perverse interpretations
by judges; a lack of commitment to Charter values by the legislative
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or executive branches of government; intractable illiberal tendencies
in our institutions and people; or the eruption of international or
domestic crises affecting our political economy, natural
environment, or public security. We do not even deny the possibility
that however bad things may have been in the recent past, they might
have been even worse without the Charter, or that they might
become better in the near future because of it. What we do claim, to
reiterate, is that the Charter does not much matter in the precise
sense that it has not - for whatever reason - significantly altered the
reality of life in Canada.
To recapitulate: this study selectively examines the progress of
groups that the Charter was intended to benefit (Aboriginal peoples,
women, visible minorities, and immigrants); areas of state action that
the Charter was intended to regulate (the criminal process and
bureaucratic behaviour); and aspects of our communal and public
life that the Charter was intended to animate and enhance (politics
and inter-group cultural relations). It relies on empirical studies that
purport to document developments in each of these areas. Most of
these studies were not undertaken with a view to assessing the
effects of the Charter, and, indeed, many of them do not even
mention it. Rather, they focus on how things have actually changed,
if at all, in each area since 1982. And to reiterate: this selective focus
based on the availability of evidence has had several limiting effects.
First, we have used only longitudinal studies (or series of studies),
which allows us to evaluate the extent and direction of change; and
we have had to accept the periodicizational, methodological, and
other limitations of these studies. Second, we have therefore failed
adequately to investigate some fields where the Charter may indeed
have had dramatic effects, such as the standing of gays, lesbians, and
disabled persons,55 but where social data are lacking. Third, we have
55 Limitations of time, space, and available data have prevented us from
investigating the experience of persons with disabilities, which, we suspect,
approximates that of visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples. Persons with
disabilities have been trapped in the cycle of economic deprivation that we
explore in our conclusion in part VII. Indeed, their economic position may be
more dire, since their full participation in economic life requires investments
in the retrofitting of housing, schools, workplaces, and public facilities, as
well as profound alterations in entrenched attitudes and procedures in those
and other venues. See the groundbreaking, but largely non-empirical,
research of M. David Lepofsky: "The Long Arduous Road to a Barrier-Free
Ontario for People With Disabilities: The History of the Ontarians With
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not thoroughly documented certain phenomena, such as growing
income inequality, which, though of great concern to many Charter
beneficiaries, are not addressed by the juridical Charter itself. And
finally, we have tended to downplay speculation about what has
caused the trends we are documenting, especially speculation about
the role of law and legal institutions. While such speculation is not
only legitimate but also central to any debate over the long-term
effects of the Charter, the premise of this study is that speculation
and debate will both improve if we first focus on data that may
suggest how, if at all, Canadian society has actually changed.
IV. THE PROGRESS OF EQUALITY-SEEKING GROUPS
A. Aboriginal Peoples
On a purely theoretical level, it has been argued that the logic of
entrenching recognition of Aboriginal rights within the body of an
essentially liberal, Western, and individualistic legal device was
tenuous if not innately dysfunctional.5 6 It is hardly surprising, then,
that the actual impact on the lives of First Nations peoples of the
Charter (and of the simultaneous recognition and affirmation of their
"existing aboriginal and treaty rights") 7 has been ambiguous at best.
Various indicators suggest a lack of progress towards social and
economic equality for First Nations peoples in the Charter era. An
Assembly of First Nations (AFN) report 8 noted in 2001 that "a
Disabilities Act - The First Chapter" (2003-2004) 15 National J. of
Constitutional Law 125; "A Report Card on the Charter's Guarantee of
Equality to Persons with Disabilities after 10 Years: What Progress? What
Prospects?" (1997) 7 National J. of Constitutional Law 263; and "The
Charter's Guarantee of Equality to People with Disabilities: How Well Is It
Working?" (1998) 16 Windsor Yearbook on Access to Justice 155.
56 Mary Ellen Turpel argues that the exercise of Aboriginal rights under the
Charter requires claimants to work within an alien discourse that is ill-suited
to their reality and their needs. "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian
Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" in Richard F. Devlin,
ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications Ltd., 1991) 503 at 517-19.
57 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 29 at s. 35(1)
58 Assembly of First Nations Communications Unit, "Fact Sheet: Socio-
Economic Exclusion of First Nations in Canada" (2001), online:
<http://www.afh.calPrograms/Treaties%20and%2OLands/factsheets/seefact.
htm> [AFN, "Socio-Economic Exclusion"].
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glaring socio-economic disparity between First Nations and
Canadian citizens" still existed despite the Charter and the
constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights. This
disparity existed because "Canadian authorities very often flout the
rights of First Nations and/or fail to follow up on certain judgments
made by the Supreme Court" regarding these rights. The
unemployment rate for non-native Canadians in 1996 was 9.8
percent, compared to 28.7 percent for Indians on reserves. Federal
spending on Aboriginals through the Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development (DIAND) represented only 0.5 percent
of Canada's gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999, while natural
resources taken from First Nations' ancestral lands accounted for
11.1 percent of GDP. A 1998 United Nations (UN) report found
"little or no progress in the alleviation of social and economic
deprivation among Aboriginal people" in Canada.59 In 2002,
Aboriginal representation in the federal public service has improved
somewhat, but to a lesser extent than for women, visible minorities
(2.4 percent), or persons with disabilities (1.3 percent).60 While
Aboriginal peoples' representation improved from 1989 to 1998 in
the categories of management and administrative support (by 0.9 and
1.2 percent, respectively), it dropped for scientific and professional
positions in the mid-1990s and only returned to its 1989 level (1.6
percent) by the period's end. Overall, Aboriginals continued to be
less well-represented than any other group in each of the three
61categories.
Despite the universal applicability of Charter equality provisions,
employment equity policies produced highly variable results for
Aboriginal peoples as between the federal and provincial
jurisdictions and as among the provinces, no doubt due to variation
'9 Ibid.
60 Abigail B. Bakan, Audrey Lynn Kobayashi & Status of Women Canada,
"Employment Equity Policy in Canada: An Interprovincial Comparison"
(2000), online: Status of Women Canada <http://dsppsd.pwgsc.gc.cal
Collection/SW21-46-1999E.pdf> at 67 [Bakan, Kobayashi & SWC]. Another
study similarly notes an increase in representation from 1.8 percent in 1986
to 2.2 percent in 1995. See T. John Samuel & Aly Karam, "Employment
Equity for Visible Minorities" [Samuel & Karam] in Leo Driedger & Shiva
S. Halli, eds., Race and Racism: Canada's Challenge (Montreal: Published
for Carleton University by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) 134 at 139
[Driedger & Halli].
61 Bakan, Kobayashi & SWC, ibid. at 68.
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"in the demographic structure of the work force, in economic
conditions that affect job availability and work force needs, and
variations in cultural and political practices" within each
jurisdiction.62 For example, Ontario's provocatively entitled Job
Quotas RepealAct 1995 3 put an end to a brief statutory experiment
designed to promote employment equity for Aboriginals (as well as
for women, visible minorities, and disabled people).64 Legislation
apart, Ontario Aboriginals continued, in general, to experience far
higher unemployment than non-racialized groups at all levels of
education,65 as well as lower employment rates two years after post-
secondary graduation.66 Aboriginal peoples made modest gains in
occupational status in areas such as management and the
professions,67 but they remained under-represented relative to foreign
and Canadian-born racial minorities. They remained most heavily
concentrated in sales/service or semi-skilled occupations.68
While under-represented in the workforce, Aboriginal peoples
were over-represented in the penal system.69 Despite comprising
62 Ibid. at 23.
63 Job Quotas Repeal Act 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 4
64 Contrary to what is implied by the polemical title of the repealing statute, the
repealed statute - the Employment Equity Act, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 35 - did not
actually mandate the use of quotas to advance employment equity. The repeal
statute was unsuccessfully challenged on Charter grounds by the four
intended beneficiary groups: Ferrel v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 149
D.L.R. (4"0) 335, aff'd. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 97(C.A.), appeal dismissed
[1999] SCCA No. 79. See Bakan, Kobayashi & SWC, supra note 60 at 32.
65 See Jean Lock Kunz, Anne Milan & Sylvain Schetagne, UnequalAccess: A
Canadian Profile ofRacialDifferences in Education, Employment and Income
A Report Preparedfor Canadian Race Relations Foundation by the Canadian
Council on SocialDevelopment (Toronto: The Foundation, 2000) at 19 [Kunz,
Milan & Schetagne].
66 Ibid. at 20.
67 The percentage of Aboriginals in senior and middle management increased
from 6.3 percent in 1991 to 6.9 percent in 1996, while in it increased from 9.4
to 11.1 percent in the professions. Ibid. at 21.
68 For instance, by 1996, 19.7 percent of Aboriginals were employed in the
category of "Sales/Service-Other Manual Workers," compared to just 9.6
percent of Canadian-born visible minorities. Ibid. at 20-21.
69 See generally, Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal
Peoples and the Justice System: Report of the National Round Table on
Aboriginal Justice Issues (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
1993); Correctional Services Canada Aboriginal Issues Branch, "Demographic
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only 2.8 percent of the population of Canada (according to 1996
Census data),7" Aboriginals contributed a multiple of this figure to
populations admitted to provincial/territorial custody (17 percent) or
on probation (13 percent) during the 1990s.7 During approximately
the same period, Aboriginals rose from 11 percent to 17 percent of
the federal prison population.72
The 1998 UN report cited by the AFN 3 decried continuing
problems with housing and the persistently high suicide rate among
Aboriginal peoples. The issue of Aboriginal suicide occupied a
prominent place in the analysis of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), whose studies revealed that suicide
rates of Inuit and Indians were respectively 3.3 times and 3.9 times
higher than the national average for the preceding ten to fifteen
years. 4 This rate fluctuated wildly from 1979 to 1991, reaching its
highest points in 1981 and 1987, while tracking trends in the general
population from 1985 to 1991.71
RCAP also documented the deplorable state of housing for
Overview of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and Aboriginal Offenders in
Federal Corrections" (20 July 1999), online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/
prgrm/correctional/abissues/know/lOe.shtml> 2.1 [Correctional Services
Canada].
70 Ibid. at 1.0.
71 The overall rate in each category has not varied by more than 2 percent over
ten years, despite greater fluctuations within each province/territory. Canadian
Centre for Justice Statistics, "Aboriginal Peoples in Canada" (2001), online:
Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.ca:80/english/freepub/85FOO33MIE/
85F0033MIE01001.pdf> at 18.
72 Correctional Services Canada, supra note 69 at 2.1.1.
73 AFN, "Socio-Economic Exclusion," supra note 58.
74 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Choosing Life: Special
Report on Suicide Among Aboriginal People (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1995) at 11 (Co-chairs Rene Dussault & Georges Erasmus).
Given the increase in population since the 1960s to the Commission's report
in 1995, this translated into an increase of "about 70 percent" in "absolute
numbers" for the period. This does not take into account estimates to the effect
that "up to 25 per cent of accidental deaths among Aboriginal people are really
unreported suicides." Ibid. at 17.
75 Ibid. at 13. This suggests there was no correlation between the inception and
operation of the Charter and conditions affecting suicide rates in Aboriginal
communities or the country as a whole.
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Aboriginal peoples."6 Most significant for our purposes are the
changes that occurred during the Charter era." RCAP noted that -
despite escalating need - federal and provincial funding had actually
declined from 1988 to 1995,78 which reduced the supply of new fully
financed, on-reserve homes from 1,800 in 1991 to 700 in 19952l9
From 1986 onwards, funding for low-income housing on reserves
was less than that available elsewhere,"° while subsidies for building
and repairs between 1988-1989 to 1993-1994 succeeded in bringing
just 46 percent of homes to "adequate" status according to the
modest standards of the Department of Indian Affairs and North
Development (DLAND).8 Further, DIAND's capital subsidy housing
program budget had not been increased since 1983.82 However, by
1993-1994, 92.1 percent of on-reserve households had water service
and 85.6 percent had sewage service 3 - in both cases, a measurable
improvement.
Many studies have documented the poor state of Aboriginal
health. While Aboriginal life expectancy has improved over the past
few decades and has moved somewhat closer to that of the general
population, the gap remained significant throughout the Charter era.
Thus, in 1978-198 1, immediately before the advent of the Charter,
Indian men had a life expectancy of 61.6 years compared to 71 years
for non-Indians; by 1990, the gap narrowed from 9.4 years to 7;84
76 Canada. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples vol. 3, (1 August 1996) s. 4 (Co-chairs
Ren6 Dussault & Georges Erasmus), online: The Commission
<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/index_e.html>
7 RCAP does not suggest a Charter-based obligation to provide housing, but
does suggest such an obligation might exist under s. 36(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982. Ibid. vol. 3, s, 4 at 2.2.
78 Ibid. vol. 3, s. 4.
7 Ibid. vol. 3, s. 4 at 1.2.
80 Ibid. vol. 3, s. 4 at 2.2.
SI The level of funding allocated should have been sufficient to bring this
number to 95 percent. Ibid. at vol. 3, s. 4.
8 This was supplemented by funding provided under Bill C-31 (infra note 87)
in 1994. Ibid. at vol. 3, s. 4 at 4.1.
83 An improvement from the 1990-1991 figures of 86.4 and 80 percent,
respectively. Ibid. at vol. 3, s. 4 at 3
84 Ibid. at vol. 3, s. 3 at 1. 1.
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but by 1996 it had widened again to 7.5 years.
85
Related to concerns about the social and economic well-being of
Aboriginal peoples are concerns about language, culture, and
identity. An AFN report relying on census data from 1981 and 1996
describes the "steady erosion" of Aboriginal languages. Respondents
who reported speaking an Aboriginal mother tongue rose by 24
percent, but those speaking it in the home grew by only 7 percent;
consequently, the incidence of those speaking an Aboriginal
language at home declined from 76 percent to 65 percent. The
decline was particularly pronounced for "endangered" languages,
and home use of some had "practically disappeared by the 1990s.,,86
More obviously attributable to the Charter is the effect of Bill C-
31,87 passed in 1985 as the result of Charter challenges to citizenship
provisions of the Indian Act88 that discriminated against Aboriginal
women. A former president of the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples
describes C-3 1 as "the Abocide bill" because its now-gender-neutral
provisions eliminated Indian status for Aboriginals after two
consecutive generations of marriage to non-status Indians. Although
the bill restored status to many women who had lost it, it also
empowered bands to deny "C-31 Indians" the right to live on the
reserves. Approximately 40 percent of bands, including some of the
country's largest, have availed themselves of this authority, thus
making them ineligible for the majority of benefits associated with
status under the Indian Act.89
85 Ren6e Dupuis, Robert Chodos & Susan Joanis, Justice for Canada's
Aboriginal Peoples (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2002) at 26.
This study provides a second indicator, the incidence of tuberculosis per
100,000 population: even after a dramatic decline from 58.1 in 1991 to 35.8
in 1996, incidence among registered Indians on reserve was, at its lowest, still
six times as high as for the general population.
86 Assembly of First Nations, "Canada's Aboriginal Languages 1996" (20 July
2002), online: <http://www.afn.ca/PressReleases&Speeches/canada.htm>.
87 Bill C-31, An Act to Amend the Indian Act, enacted as R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (1 st
Supp.).
88 R.S.C. 1985, Chap. I-5 [Indian Act].
89 Harry W. Daniels, "Bill C-31: The Abocide Bill" (19 July 1998), online:
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples <http://www.abo-peoples.org/programs/C-3 1/
Abocide/Abocide-2.htm#Overview>.
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While not exclusively Charter concerns,90 debates over the well-
being of Aboriginal peoples have often implicated issues relating to
their lands, resources, and governance. Some significant milestones
have been passed in recent decades - the founding of Nunavut and
the ratification of the Nisga'a Treaty in British Columbia, for
example - but there have been many setbacks as well. An AFN
assessment of the land claims and treaties processes in 1991
bemoans the federal government's "obvious failure to adequately
address the land rights issues of Canada's aboriginal peoples" and
argues that "[its] approach to aboriginal matters has remained
fundamentally unchanged" despite the entrenchment in the
Constitution Act, 1982 of Aboriginal and treaty rights.91 The AFN
estimated that, in addition to the 578 specific claims acknowledged
by government, approximately 1,000 more were in the course of
preparation. However, AFN noted, only forty-four claims had been
settled between 1973 and 1991, and of 275 claims at various stages
in the settlement process, probably "not ... more than a dozen"
were in active negotiation as of 1991.92 As of March 2003, Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada reported 251 claims settled, out of a
90 To clarify the authors' position, our discussion of equality, land claims, and
treaty and self-government rights of Aboriginal peoples does not depend on
s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which is technically not part of the
Charter, although enacted contemporaneously with it. Rather, we are
exploring the benefits to Aboriginal peoples of s. 15 equality rights, and of the
protection of land claims and treaty rights under s. 25 of the Charter, which
the federal government itself recognizes as mandating the inherent right of
self-government as a factor in Charter interpretation. Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada, "The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation
of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government"
online: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy e.html>. Aboriginal groups have declared that the
inherent right is enshrined in s. 25. See Assembly of First Nations,
"Implementation of Treaty Rights and the Inherent Rights to Self-
Government-November 19, 1992," online: <http://www.afn.ca/resolutions/
1992/con-nov/res I1 .htm>.
91 Assembly of First Nations, "A Critique of Federal Government Land Claims
Policies" in Frank Cassidy ed., Aboriginal Self-Determination: Proceedings
of a Conference Held September 30 - October 3, 1990 (Lantzville, B.C.:
Oolichan Books & The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991) 232 at
232.
92 Ibid. at 241.
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total of 1,185 specific claims considered since 19739' Only fifteen
comprehensive claims have been settled over the same thirty-year
period.94 In British Columbia, where the majority of comprehensive
claims originate, progress has been slow. The B.C. Treaty
Commission's Annual Report 2001 lists two First Nations at the
second stage of negotiation, four at the third stage, forty-two at the
fourth stage, and just one at the fifth stage.95 The following year, the
numbers were unchanged except that the number of nations at the
second stage had risen from two to six96 (meaning only that the
government had accepted statements of intent to negotiate from four
additional nations, and held an initial meeting with each). The
Commission, in explaining its lack of progress, blamed the Supreme
Court's 1997 ruling in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia97 (which
forced all parties into a lengthy reconsideration of their positions),
the 2000 federal election, the 2001 British Columbia provincial
election, the B.C. government's suspension of negotiations pending
a referendum, a general overload of the treaty-negotiating system,
and a high turnover of negotiators participating in the process.98 In
short, institutions at all levels of the process had - deliberately or
inadvertently - frustrated progress on land claims settlements.
Progress toward Aboriginal self-government has been equally
halting. Explicit constitutional recognition of an Aboriginal right of
self-government was delayed indefinitely with the failure of the
Charlottetown Accord in 1992. In the interim, federal policy has
come to focus on recognition of self-government under the umbrella
of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, as part of the negotiation
93 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Implementation Branch, "National Mini
Summary: Specific Claims Branch" (26 July 2003), online: <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ps/clm/nms_e.html>.
94 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Implementation Branch,
"Comprehensive Policy and Status of Claims, February 2003" (February
2003), online: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ps/clm/brieff e.pdf> at 3.
95 The fifth stage involves finalizing a treaty. B.C. Treaty Commission, "Annual
Report 2001: The Year in Review" (2001), online: <http://www.bctreaty.net/
files_2/pdf documents/200 1_annual report.pdf> at 7.
96 B.C. Treaty Commission, "The Changing Landscape: Annual Report 2002"
(2002), online: B.C. Treaty Commission <http://www.bctreaty.net/files_2/
pdf documents/2002_annual.pdf> at 6.
9' [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
98 B.C. Treaty Commission, "LookingBack, Looking Forward: A Review of the
B.C. Treaty Process" (2001), online: <http://www.bctreaty.net/files_3/pdf
documents/review bc treatyprocess.pdf> at 5.
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of comprehensive agreements and new treaties, and as an additional
dimension to existing treaties. 9 A 1999 parliamentary research
report, updated in 2000, complained that "[m]any years of
negotiations have, to date, produced relatively few self-government
agreements.""' ° To little avail: no new agreements were reached
between 1999 and 2002.101 Shortly afterwards, the federal
government introduced - and, in the face of strong AFN protests,
promptly withdrew - the highly interventionist First Nations
Governance Act. 102
In short, progress for Aboriginal peoples during the Charter era
has been non-existent in some respects, such as rates of
incarceration; glacial in others, such as land claims and self-
government; perceptible but still modest in regard to health and life
expectancy; and positive but uneven in regard to living standards and
employment prospects. However, there is no evidence to suggest the
Charter was responsible for any improvements that did occur.
Indeed, it seems far more likely that any modest gains realized were
the product of a prolonged campaign of grassroots mobilization
through coalition-building, the leverage of double-edged judicial
pronouncements, 10 temporary and fickle public support engendered
99 Mary C. Hurley & Jill Wherrett, "Aboriginal Self-Government" (1 August
2000), online: Library of Parliament, Parliamentary Research Branch
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb9919-e.htm>.
100 Ibid.
101 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, "Agreements" (28 October 2005), online:
<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/indexe.html#FinalAgreements l>. The
process evidently lurched forward in the year of the Charter's twentieth
anniversary: whereas only twelve final self-government agreements were
achieved between 1992 and 2002, an additional ten were completed between
2002 and 2005. Given that the Charter itself has not changed in this time, it
would appear that progress in this area has been more a function of political
whim or will.
102 Assembly of First Nations, News Release "Standing Committee Forces End
to Debate on Governance Act in Spite of Wide-Spread Opposition" (27 May
2003), online: Treaty Justice <http://www.treatyjustice.org/docs/billc7/
articles/enddebate.html>. At the time of writing, the incoming Paul Martin
Liberal government had cancelled this initiative - at least in its then-current
form - in keeping with promises made to First Nations leaders during Martin's
2003 party leadership bid.
103 For example, Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313, which
was ambiguous in its result but sufficiently supportive of a hazily defined
concept of Aboriginal title to prompt the federal government to negotiate
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by the awareness-raising RCAP report, and militancy taken very
occasionally to the extreme of armed confrontation and conflict.
B. Women
It is perhaps telling that many surveys of women's progress
toward equality, at least with respect to material factors, seem not to
consider the Charter as an appropriate event or starting place from
which to measure their current status."° Julia O'Connor, writing in
1998 about representation of employment equality strategies in the
political process in Canada, begins instead with the year 1970 and
attributes changes over three decades to a list of "key factors" from
which the Charter is notably absent. These include "royal
commission reports, the policy machinery related to women's issues,
the federal government's obligations under key UN and
[International Labour Organization] treaties, the women's
movement, labour unions, and, to a lesser extent, political parties." °5
The "limited impact of the equality strategies" that has been realized
has been "advanced primarily through bureaucratic policy machinery
rather than through parliamentary or industrial relations channels""'
or, presumably, Charter litigation.0 7 Among the changes noted:
rather than take its chances with an unpredictable Supreme Court. These
negotiations would drag on for more than twenty years, culminating
eventually in the Nisga'a Treaty (brought into force by the Nisga'a Final
Agreement Act, S.C. 2000, c.7)
104 See, however, Sarah Lugtig & Debra Parkes, "Where Do We Go From Here?"
(Spring 2002) 15:4 Herizons 14 at 15-16 [Lugtig & Parkes]. Lugtig and Parkes
assess gains and losses for women specifically during the Charter era. They
identify legal victories including rights to abortion, rights of disabled women
to health care, and rights of Aboriginal women respecting votes in band
council elections - as well as political defeats - including the revocation of
the Canada Assistance Plan, decreased access to unemployment insurance,
and cuts to welfare in Ontario.
105 Julia S. O'Connor, "Employment Equality Strategies and Their Representation
in the Political Process in Canada, 1970-1994" in Manon Tremblay &
Caroline Andrew, eds., Women and Political Representation in Canada
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1998) 85 at 85 [O'Connor].
'0" Ibid. at 106.
107 O'Connor notes that the introduction ofparental leave in 1990, extending the
maternity leave and benefits won in earlier decades to men, followed a
Charter equality challenge to parental leave provisions for adoptive parents
brought by a natural father. Ibid. at 87. In this instance, the Charter was used
to deny women a monopoly over a right won by other means.
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labour participation of women with young children increased from
50 percent in 1981 to 63 percent in 1993. Within this group, those
with preschool-aged children increased their participation from 42
to 56 percent, and those with children under three years moved from
39 to 55 percent.0 8 Women's representation in the public service
(regardless of parental status) increased from 43.4 per cent in 1986
to 47.4 percent in 1995.'09 Another study measuring participation in
the federal public service from 1987 to 1998 describes a gradual
increase from 42.4 to 50.5 percent in this period."' The percentage
of paid maternity leaves increased from 77 percent in 1980 to 89
percent in 1991, though most of this 1991 figure was accounted for
solely through unemployment insurance.1 '
Has the Charter era witnessed significant improvements in the
ratio of female-to-male earnings and in women's participation in
particular occupational groups? With respect to earnings, women's
earnings rose from 64.2 percent of men's in 1980 to 71.8 percent in
1992. While the aggregate improvement is marked, there remains a
wide disparity between private- and government-sector
percentages. "2 Moreover, the gain was short-lived and not indicative
of even a slow but steady improvement in women's prospects: by
1994, women working full-time earned 68.5 percent of what their
male counterparts did, and while the figure would vary a few
percentage points from year to year," 3 by 2002 and 2003 it had
settled at 70.2 and 70.5 percent, respectively."" It should be noted
108 Ibid. at 86.
109 Samuel & Karam, supra note 60 at 139.
110 Bakan, Kobayashi & SWC, supra note 60 at 67.
111 O'Connor, supra note 105 at 86-87. O'Connor notes that despite this, some
collective agreements had begun to include maternity leave and benefit
provisions that exceeded national standards. She attributes the introduction of
paid maternity leave and benefits to action taken pursuant to a
recommendation the Royal Commission on the Status of Women made in
1970.
112 Private-sector female employees in 1980 earned 60.6 percent of men's wages
compared to 73.8 percent for female government workers; in 1992 they earned
67.9 and 79.8 percent, respectively. Wendy Robbins, "Pay Equity Laws
Provide Patchwork of Remedies" (Spring 2002) 15:4 Herizons 10.
'13 It would crest at 72.4 percent in 1995, dropping sharply by 4 percent within
two years. Statistics Canada, "Average earnings by sex and work pattern
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that the picture becomes uglier when one looks at the ratio for all
earners and not just full-time earners, which, from 1994 to 2003,
never rose above 63.6 per cent. 5 Moreover, what improvement
there has been may the product of negative causes: one analysis
maintains that women's average after-tax income rose from 52
percent of men's in 1986 to 63 percent in 1997, but it attributes this
change in part to "an 11.4% decrease in men's median earnings over
this period." 116
Moreover, income figures do not fully capture the dynamics of
women's status in the job market. As Michael Mandel notes,
"women are simultaneously waging a struggle for equality with men
qua women, and a struggle alongside men for a decent standard of
living and quality of working life qua working people." "7 A recent
review comparing data from 1967 to 1995 argues that little has
changed: in 1967, "almost half'of women aged sixty-five and over
lived below the poverty line, and by 1995, 43.3 percent were still in
poverty. The proportion of single mothers below the poverty line
increased from one-third to 57.2 percent. More women were
performing non-standard work (i.e., "work that is part-time, casual,
seasonal and without benefits or union protection") than
previously."8
115 Statistics Canada, "Average earnings by sex and work pattern (all earners),"
online: <http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst0 i/labor01 a.htm>.
116 Karen Hadley, And We Still Ain't Satisfied: Gender Inequality in Canada -A
Status Report for 2001 (Toronto: CJS Foundation for Research and Education
and The National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 2001) at 3
[Hadley].
11 Mandel, supra note 6 at 438. Writing in the mid-1990s, Mandel notes that
women "continued to be segregated into low-paying jobs," holding only 19.3
percent of the ten highest-paying jobs ("general managers and other senior
officials"), while dominating the ten lowest-paying jobs (such as stenog-
raphers, typists, and sewing machine operators). They also continued to be
"three times as likely as men to work only part-time." Mandel calculates that
accounting for such factors reduces women's earnings as a percentage of
men's from the official figure of 71.8 percent to an actual figure of 63.8
percent. Ibid. 438 at n. 74.
118 Shelagh Day & Gwen Brodsky, "Women's Economic Inequality and the
Canadian Human Rights Act" in Donna Greschner et al., eds., Women and the
Canadian Human Rights Act: A Collection of Policy Research Reports
(Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1999) 113 at 120. The authors express
their disappointment with the failure of the Canadian Human Rights Act to
accelerate the pace of change: "With quasi-constitutional prohibitions against
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Women's representation increased in all occupational groups
considered from 1984 to 1990. Most notably, the percentage of
women managers and administrators rose from 32 to 41 percent,
while the percentage of women professionals rose from 46 to 50
percent. As a percentage share of all female employment, however,
these categories constituted only 11 and 21 percent respectively.
Most women continued to be employed as clerical workers (30
percent in 1990, down from 32 percent in 1984), with a very slight
decline in those employed in unskilled service work, the third-largest
category (17 percent in 1990, down from 18 percent in 1984).
O'Connor characterizes these results as indicative of a "slow rate"
of decline in gender segregation, occurring "only at the upper end of
the occupational distribution."" 9 As Karen Hadley demonstrates,
discrimination in employment and services in place for more than two
decades, women could reasonably have expected to see more improvement."
While they note that Charter litigation has "given life to the minimalist
language of the CHRA and provincial human rights laws" (at 137), their
rebuke could well be extended to the same failure of the Charter's fully
constitutional prohibition against gender discrimination to affect the material
impact of such legislation. Karen Hadley presents recent data which supports
Day and Brodsky' s point about the greater presence of women in non-standard
occupations, reporting that 72 percent of part-time workers are women, and
that, in 1999, 28 percent of all employed women (compared with 10 percent
of men) worked less than thirty hours per week. She notes further disparities
between unionized and non-unionized non-standard work: whereas women in
the former made just 69 percent of men's wages, they made 86 percent of
men's wages in non-unionized non-standard work, "because wages for both
were close to the minimum wage floor." Hadley, supra note 116 at 8.
119 O'Connor, supra note 105 at 96-97. Recent data suggests that these trends
carried forward to 1999, when women constituted 51.8 percent of
professionals (up from a 1987 figure of 49.8 percent, but down from 52.2
percent in 1994); participation in management appeared lower than indicated
by O'Connor, starting at 28.9 percent in 1987 and rising to 35.1 percent in
1999 - unchanged from its 1994 figure. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada,
2000: A Gender-Based Statistical Report, 4th ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
2000) at 128 [Statistics Canada, Women in Canada]. Women's participation
in selected trades remained low through the latter part of the Charter era: the
percentage of women enrolled in apprenticeship programs for the major trades
in total stood at 0.6 percent in 1988 and by 1997 was still only at 1.6 percent.
Ibid. at 96. Mandel somewhat wryly notes one direct connection between the
Charter and improved representation of women in professions: the flood of
Charter litigation had increased the presence of women lawyers from 15.5
percent in 1981 to 20 percent by the time of Symes v. Canada [1993] 4 S.C.R.
695. Mandel, supra note 6 at 444-45. By 1993, women constituted 50 percent
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even progress identified at this upper end is problematic in that
equality of status is often not translated into commensurate income
gains. According to data from 1996, women in the category of
management tended to be concentrated in the lower-level
management positions, and average incomes for women in this group
stood at $39,048 compared to $58,680 for men. Moreover, women's
stronger presence in professional roles is due in large part to their
dominance in nursing and teaching (in which they hold 95 percent
and 69 percent of positions, respectively). 120 Data for 2004
continues to support this thesis, showing the number of women
nearly doubling that of men in the field of education, and more than
quadrupling it in health care and social assistance, but still lagging
behind in the "professional, scientific and technical services"
sector. 2 ' In the federal public service, women's representation in
management positions and in scientific/professional roles increased
from 14.1 percent and 25 percent in 1989 to 25.1 percent and 32.3
percent in 1998, respectively, but women's overwhelming
concentration in administrative support positions had not changed
(women constituted 83.1 percent of these workers in 1989 and 84
percent in 1998).122
Other measurements, perhaps less direct than employment and
income factors but no less material in their effect, suggest the advent
of the Charter has had relatively little impact on women's lives. Day
and Brodsky argue that, as women's socio-economic status makes
of law students, 28 percent of law professors, and 27 percent of practicing
lawyers. Ibid. at 445 n. 85.
120 Hadley, supra note 116 at 19. Hadley further notes that although women had
assumed more positions in higher-paying professions such as medicine,
dentistry, and the social sciences, they still represented just 20 percent of
professionals in natural sciences, engineering and mathematics. Ibid. By 1999,
women in the professional category filled over half of all positions in nursing,
teaching and the "artistic/literary/recreational" and "social sciences/religion"
subcategories. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada, supra note 119 at 128.
It appears these proportions are unlikely to change significantly in the first
years of the new century; women's full-time enrolment in university
engineering and applied sciences in 1997-1998, while up from its 1992-1993
figure, still only constituted 21.5 percent of program enrolment, and women
accounted for just 29.4 percent of enrolment in mathematics and physical
sciences. Ibid. at 94.
121 Statistics Canada, "Employment by industry and sex," online: <http://www40.
statcan.ca/l0 1 /cstO 1 /labor l Oa.htm >.
122 Bakan, Kobayashi & SWC, supra note 60 at 68.
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them more likely than men to rely on government programs for their
survival, they are disproportionately susceptible to adverse effects
from changes to such programs. '23 They argue that the Canadian
Health and Social Transfer and the Budget Implementation Act, "the
most drastic changes to social programs of the last 40 years," were
presented as purely fiscal measures, unrelated to the rights of
women. 24 They then demonstrate through a review of Charter cases
a disturbing tendency by governments and courts to "[conduct] the
discrimination analysis in such a way as to break the cause and effect
linkage between the inequality complained of and the Charter's
equality guarantees." 2 ' Thus, recent reductions in government
spending have had the effect of reducing both wages and
employment in the public sector. This has a disproportionate impact
on women, because the public sector offers them better jobs and
higher salaries than does the private sector and is less likely to
concentrate them in lower-status jobs. Cuts therefore reduce the
number of attractive jobs available to women."' The availability of
child care has risen and fallen over the course of the Charter era,
marked by an increase in supportive legislation and funding through
the 1980s and a levelling or reduction as a result of neo-liberal
policies adopted in the 1990s.'27 As fees increased and subsidies
123 Shelagh Day & Gwen Brodsky, Women and the Equality Deficit: The Impact
of Restructuring Canada's Social Programs (Ottawa: Status of Women
Canada, 1998) at 29-30 [Day & Brodsky]. A recent collection of essays
surveys the disproportionate impact that the neoliberal drive for privatization
has had on women: see generally, Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge,
Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002). For international comparisons, see generally Kerry
Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution, and Gender in
Market Reform (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
124 Day & Brodsky, ibid. at 30.
125 Ibid. at 82. In spite of this, the authors proceed to make Charter arguments
against the constitutionality of the Budget Implementation Act, 1997, S.C.
1997, c. 26. See ibid. at 109.
126 Isabella Bakker, "Deconstructing Macro-Economics through a Feminist Lens"
in Janine Brodie, ed., Women and Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt
Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 31 at 44-45.
127 Gillian Doherty, Martha Friendly & Mab Oloman, Women's Support,
Women 's Work: Child Care in an Era of Deficit Reduction, Devolution,
Downsizing and Deregulation (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998) at
17-19 [Doherty, Friendly & Oloman].
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fluctuated, 2 ' overall access to child care diminished, as did
opportunities for choice among alternative child care services. The
consequence was to constrain women's options with respect to their
participation in the labour force.'29 Whether recent initiatives by the
federal government will reverse these trends remains to be seen.'30
The availability of affordable housing for women has evidently
been unaffected by the entrenchment of equality rights. In Toronto,
higher vacancy rates in the 1990s did not ease the problem of
homelessness. In fact, shelter use rose from roughly 1,000 per day in
the mid-1980s to nearly 5,000 at the end of the 1990s, and "among
shelter users the proportion of women has risen dramatically."'
This is attributable to a combination of rising rents and increasing
128 Day care and other fees increased from 1993 to 1995 in most provinces and
territories, while family income dropped. The national average after-tax
income dropped from $47,300 in 1989 to $43,700 in 1994, measured in
constant 1994 dollars. Generally, child care fees increased in all jurisdictions
from 1989 to 1995 while provincial/territorial subsidies variously stayed the
same, decreased or increased; interview data suggests, however, that
regardless of changes in the dollar amounts of subsidies, child care workers
in all jurisdictions but Manitoba and the Northwest Terriorties perceived that
subsidies had not kept pace with increases in fees. Ibid. at 19-25. The number
of day care spaces has increased nationally. Statistics Canada, Women in
Canada, supra note 119 at 109.
129 Doherty Friendly & Oloman, supra note 127 at 32-33.
130 A political compromise between the Liberal minority government and the
NDP resulted in increased spending for social programs via revisions to the
February 2005 budget. The revised budget, passed as Bill C-48, An Act to
authorize the Minister of Finance to make certain payments, received royal
assent 20 July 2005. The budget sets aside $700 million in trust in 2005 and
2006 for the creation of a national child care program. CBC News, "Indepth:
Budget 2005 - Highlights"(24 June 2005), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/budget2005/>. Details of this initiative are given in the
government's summary of the budget plan: Government of Canada,
Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2005 (Ottawa: Department
of Finance Canada, 2005) at 116-20. Prime Minister Paul Martin described it
as a "very important budget for child care." CBC News, "Commons amends
budget in surprise midnight vote" (24 June 2005), online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/06/24/newparliament050624.
html>.
131 Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation, Women's Housing Program,
Women and Housing in Canada: Barriers to Equality (Toronto: Centre for
Equality Rights in Accommodation, 2002), online: http://www.equalityrights.
org/cera/docs/CERAWomenHous.htm [Women's Housing Program].
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economic inequality over the past two decades," 2 the impact of
which was felt disproportionately by women, who comprise by far
the largest group of renters requiring assistance. 3 a
The availability of abortions for women who want them has been
used as an example of the concrete impact of constitutional rights
litigation in both the U.S. 34 and Canada.' While Bogart, writing in
the mid-1990s, speculated that "access to abortions, across the
country as a whole, may be decreasing,"' 36 the picture is actually
more complicated. Abortions per 1,000 women increased in Canada
from 11.8 in 1982 to 14.9 as of 2002, while abortions per 100 live
births increased from 19 to 32.1.137 However, the Charter's equality
provisions notwithstanding, access to abortions varies widely across
the country. From 1996 to 2000, no clinic abortions were reported
from the three territories or the provinces of Saskatchewan or Prince
Edward Island; the number of clinic abortions per year decreased
markedly in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Manitoba even as it
132 Ibid. The cuts to social assistance became the subject of an unsuccessful
Charter challenge in Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social
Service), (1996) 134 D.L.R. (4 h) 20 (Ont. Div. Ct.). The Centre for Equality
Rights in Accommodation makes note of another such case, Gosselin c.
Quebec (Procureurg~n~ral) (2002) 221 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (S.C.C.), which also
proved unsuccessful - and argues that "[tihis type of litigation must continue
to be initiated." Ibid.
133 Women's Housing Program, supra note 131 at 19.
134 Rosenberg, supra note 40; Bogart, Courts and Country, supra note 10.
135 Bogart, ibid. This argument is reproduced in part in W.A. Bogart, "Women's
Issues and the Impact of Litigation" [Bogart, "Women's Issues"] in Margaret
Jackson & N. Kathleen Sam Banks, eds., Ten Years Later: The Charter and
Equality for Women: A Symposium Assessing the Impact of the Equality
Provisions on Women in Canada (Burnaby: Public Policy Programs Simon
Fraser University at Harbour Centre, 1996) 107 [Jackson & Banks].
136 Bogart, "Women's Issues" ibid. at 114. He explains: "It is possible to obtain
an abortion if near a clinic and in that regard there maybe more abortions.
However, aside from these limited areas abortions across the country may now
be less accessible. For example, in Ontario only about half of gynecologists
and less than 1% of general practitioners perform the procedure."
137 For the period of 1982 to 1995, see Statistics Canada, Women in Canada,
supra note 119 at 73. For the period of 1998 to 2002, see Statistics Canada,
"Induced abortions by age group," online: <http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/
cst0 l/health43.htm>; Statistics Canada, "Induced abortions per 100 live births




72 Does the Charter Matter?
was rising in central Canada and British Columbia.' Disparity
continued from 1998 to 2002, with the same provinces and territories
still not reporting, but clinic abortions did rise at uneven rates in all
provinces except Nova Scotia. 3 9
This disparity in access to clinical abortions is disturbing since
the overall increase in the abortion rate appears to be attributable to
a seven-fold increase in such abortions. Most of this increase
occurred within two years of the Supreme Court's Charter-based
ruling in the first Morgentaler case. 4 This appears to be a clear
instance in which the Charter did indeed "matter." However, and
certainly contrary to the spirit of the Charter, it mattered much more
in some parts of the country than in others.
Evidence with respect to changes in the extent of violence against
women in the Charter era is mixed. Spousal assaults became less
common, though not in all provinces;'41 spousal homicides ofwomen
1 Statistics Canada, "Induced Abortions by Province and Territory of Report"
(Clinics), 1996-2000," online: <http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/health40c.
htm> [Statistics Canada, "Induced Abortions, 1996-2000].
139 In Nova Scotia, abortions actually dropped in number for this period. The
number in British Columbia increased by over 2,500, compared to an increase
of just forty-five in Ontario. Statistics Canada, "Induced Abortions by
Province and Territory of Report" (Clinics), 1998-2002," online: Statistics
Canada <http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst0 1 /health40c.htm>[Statistics Canada,
"Induced Abortions, 1998-2002"].
140 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Morgentaler]. In 1990, the number of
abortions performed in clinics nationwide jumped to 20,236 (from 7,059 in the
previous year). Similarly, the number of clinic abortions per 1,000 women
increased from 1.1 to 3.2 while the number per 100 live births jumped from
1.8 to 5. The trend began, however, immediately after Morgentaler. The
number of abortions leaped from 4,617 to 7,059 between 1988 and 1989; the
1988 figure was actually down from a pre-Charter high in 1980. The
difference from 1988 to 1989, while much smaller than that from 1989 to
1990, was to that point the single largest increase in availability of clinic
abortions since clinics began in 1978. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada,
supra note 119 at 73. Recent data suggest that the number of clinic abortions
per year continued to rise from 1996 to 1998, after which it dropped slightly
and recovered by 2000, only to drop again to a lower rate in 2002 than in
1998. See Statistics Canada, "Induced Abortions, 1996-2000," ibid.; Statistics
Canada, "Induced Abortions, 1998 to 2002," supra note 138.
141 Status of Women Canada (SWC) reports that from 1993 to 1999 the incidence
of spousal assault against women for the country as a whole dropped from 12
to 8 percent of couples, though it remained the same or rose in three
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fluctuated; 4 2 sexual assaults of lesser severity rose and fell, while
those of greater severity dropped somewhat;'43 but stalking of
women by intimate partners may well have increased.'" Status of
Women Canada attributes the apparent reduction in spousal assaults
and the actual decrease in spousal violence to "improved social
interventions, such as the increased use of services by abused
women," but cautions that "it is still too early to draw any definitive
conclusions."' 45
There is some suggestion that victims of sexual harassment in the
workplace have gained greater access to remedies as a result of the
Charter. Beth Symes, while offering no supporting evidence,
attributes this change (and others) in the status of women to the
effect, albeit indirect, of the Charter.146 However, the extent of the
Charter's contribution is by no means clear. As Symes herself notes,
harassment "is now specifically prohibited in human rights
legislation, has been negotiated into many collective agreements and
provinces. Status of Women Canada & Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Ministers Responsible for the Status of Women (Canada), Assessing Violence
Against Women: A Statistical Profile (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada,
2002) at 12 [SWC, Assessing Violence].
142 SWC, Assessing Violence, ibid. at 17. The report's authors speculate that
reductions in the rate have been due to "increased community-based supports,
mandatory charging policies and improved training of police officers... [and]
the fact that women may have developed a lower tolerance for spousal
violence and an increased tendency to leave relationships before the violence
reaches a critical and deadly stage." Ibid. at 17-18. Although changes in
domestic legislation are reviewed, the Charter is mentioned only once, in the
context of a portion of one provincial bill that was revised in response to
Charter challenges. Ibid. at 64.
141 Ibid. at 18-20.
'4 Ibid. at 20-21. Harassment by ex-husbands rose from 900 reported incidents
in 1995 to approximately 1,300 in 2000; "boyfriends" began at just over 400
in 1995, dropped slightly in 1997, and had risen to approximately 500 by
2000.
14 Ibid. at 21.
14 While noting that these changes cannot be attributed directly to the Charter,
Symes paraphrases Sylvia Bashevkin's argument that "the enactment of the
Charter in 1982 created an early momentum which generated higher
expectations for women in Canada than for [their] counterparts in the United
Kingdom in the United States." Beth Symes, "Ten Years Later: Is the Charter
an Appropriate Tool for Social Change?" in Jackson & Banks, supra note 135,
11 at 23.
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workplaces have designed workplace discrimination and harassment
policies to deal with this issue."'47 This would seem to suggest that
the problem is being dealt with largely outside the ambit of the
Charter. Indeed, a 1999 analysis of sexual harassment complaints
to the Canadian Human Rights Commission attributed the increased
level of harassment claims not to the Charter but to a Supreme Court
decision that makes no mention of the Charter, even by way of
background.
48
Political representation of Canadian women has clearly increased
since the Charter was adopted in 1982. Trimble and Arscott report
that from 1970 to 2000, the proportion of women in provincial
legislatures improved from 2.3 per cent to 26 per cent. 49 But the
news was not uniformly good. With respect to women's presence in
provincial government, the authors note that there is no single
pattern of linear progress, but rather four distinct patterns, with some
provinces and territories showing steady improvement in women's
representation over the last five elections, others showing decline,
some trapped in a holding pattern, and still others recovering from
recent sharp declines.5°
41 Ibid. at 21.
148 Sandy Welsh, Myrna Dawson & Elizabeth Griffiths, "Sexual Harassment
Complaints and the Canadian Human Rights Commission" in Donna
Greschner et al., eds., Women and the Canadian Human Rights Act: A
Collection of Policy Research Reports (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada,
1999) 177 at 189, citing Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. (1989), 58 Man. R.
(2d) 1 (S.C.C.). Strangely, other authors cite this same case, which found
sexual harassment to be a form of sexual discrimination, as evidence of
progress under the Charter, again despite the fact that the case does not cite
or mention it. See Lugtig & Parkes, supra note 104.
149 Linda Trimble & Jane Arscott, Still Counting: Women in Politics Across
Canada. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2003) at 40 [Trimble &
Arscott]. See also Donley T. Studlar & Richard E. Matland, "The Dynamics
of Women's Representation in the Canadian Provinces: 1975-1994" (1996)
29 Canadian J. of Political Science 269 at 273 [Studlar & Matland], which
tracks the progress of women in provincial politics from 1975 to 1993 and
concludes that, although progress was considerable in every province (except,
perhaps in Newfoundland, which started at 2 percent and never rose above its
1984 figure of 5.8 percent), the final percentage and the rate of growth varied
widely from province to province. The highest percentage reached anywhere
was in Prince Edward Island at 28 in 1993; in that year, figures were in the
double-digits everywhere except Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.
150 Trimble & Arscott, ibid. at 53-56.
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The percentage of female members of the federal Parliament rose
from just 0.4 per cent in 1970 to 20.6 per cent in 2000, while the
percentage of women Senators for the same period rose from 4.5 to
40 per cent.'' Candidacy of females in federal elections increased
steadily across the three major political parties of the day, with the
most dramatic increases occurring between 1985 and 1994.112 A
similar pattern obtains for female candidates for provincial
legislatures.' Studlar and Matland cite systemic and policy factors
accounting for improvements in women's representation,'5 4 but also
attribute it to the heightened political mobilization of the women's
movement in the 1980s and 1990s, a trend in which the adoption of
the gender equality clause of the Charter was a "watershed event."'55
It is difficult to imagine the Charter as a decisive factor, though,
when one compares Canada's progress to that of other countries;
while women's representation at the federal level had risen to 18
percent in 1993, it was still below the levels of nine industrialized
democracies, including countries (Sweden, the Netherlands,
Germany, and Austria) where women won the franchise at about the
same time as in Canada.' Even as the Canadian figure rose from
l ibid. at 40.
152 Studlar & Matland, supra note 149 at 281. Progress, not uniform, was greatest
in the NDP and least in the former Progressive Conservative (PC) party. Ibid.
at 280. Trimble & Arscott carry this comparison forward from 1993 to 2000
and reveal that by the latter date, only 13 per cent of PC candidates were
women, compared to 22 per cent of Liberal and 30 per cent of NDP
candidates. Worst of all was Canadian Alliance, for which only 1I per cent of
candidates were women. Ibid. at 63.
153 Studlar & Matland, ibid. at 283-84.
154 Among these are the "extraordinarily high" turnover rate of Members of
Parliament in the House of Commons and provincial legislatures, the weaker
incumbency advantage of Canadian politicians due to the "volatility of the
electorate," and proactive policies of the NDP, which were "specially
designed to improve women's representation." Ibid. at 275.
15 Ibid. at 291.
156 Non-aboriginal Canadian women gained the right to vote in 1918. In 1995,
Sweden had the highest representation at 40 percent, followed by Norway at
39 percent and Finland at 34 percent. Lynda Erickson, "Entry to the
Commons: Parties, Recruitment, and the Election of Women in 1993" in
Caroline Andrew & Manon Tremblay, eds., Women and Political
Representation in Canada (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1998) 219 at
222 [Erickson].
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20.6 percent in 2000 to 21.1 percent in 2004,17 Canada placed only
thirty-eighth out of 127 countries with women elected to national
parliaments.'58 The tendency of parties to nominate women
candidates in ridings where there was little chance of winning
persisted into the mid-1980s, but the practice had diminished
considerably and arguably disappeared by the mid-1990s.
159
Moving from raw numbers to practical explanations, a candidate
survey taken after the 1993 election revealed broad discrepancies
from party to party with respect to candidates' perception of the need
for more women's representation. 160 Despite Studlar and Matland's
157 The number of women candidates rose more sharply, from 20.7 percent in
2000 to 23.2 percent in 2004. However, as a result, the percentage of
successful women candidates actually fell somewhat. Gina Bishop, "Women's
Representation After the 2004 Federal Election" 6 Opinion Canada (21
November 2004), online: <http://www.opinion-canada.ca/en/articles/
articleI I 1.html [Bishop].
158 This 21.1 percent amounted to 65 seats out of 308 in the House of Commons.
Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments: World
Classification," online: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif. htm>. Canada's
modest record in electing women to parliament accounts in part for its recent
decline from first to third to eighth in the United Nations Human Development
ratings. Most of the countries ranked higher overall also ranked higher than
Canada with respect to percentages of women in government at the ministerial
level (24.3 percent in Canada) and representation in parliament at the lower-
or single-house level (20.6 percent). Interestingly, Canada had the highest
percentage of women in its upper house or senate among those top-ten
countries with bicameral federal parliaments (32.4 percent). United Nations
Development Programme, Human Development Report 2003: Millennium
Development Goals: A CompactAmong Nations to End Human Poverty (New
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 327.
159 Studlar & Matland, supra note 149 at 289.
160 NDP candidates most strongly supported the proposition that "there should be
many more women" in Parliament, at 85 percent. Liberal support ran at 59
percent, and Reform support was the lowest at 20 percent. Significantly, 73
percent of female Reform candidates supported it, while only 15 percent of
male Reform candidates did. The party with the next-largest gender response
gap was the Liberal party in which 91 percent of women supported, compared
to 48 percent of men. Erickson, supra note 156 at 228-29. Although the
political map had been redrawn by the time of the 2004 election, it appears
that partisan commitments to this issue had remained static. In 2004, 24
percent of Liberal candidates were women, while only 12 percent of
candidates for the new Conservatives - the ideological inheritors of the
Reform Party and later the Canadian Alliance - were women. Bishop, supra
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optimistic findings, Erickson presents survey data indicating that
constituency associations still made less effort to recruit women
when they assessed their party's chance of electoral victory as
"good" than when they considered it "unlikely" or "hopeless."''
Erickson makes no mention of the Charter in accounting for results
good or bad; she instead argues that levels of representation are a
function of party nomination policies and attitudes, and that the
"supply" of women candidates - the paucity of which is part of the
problem - is a function of "a system of social practices through
which women's lives and resources are constrained by gender-
structured opportunities and expectations."' 62
The significance of the Charter era for women has thus been
marginal at best in the political domain. The Charter has no doubt
symbolically reinforced the political mobilization of Canadian
women. However, judging by the greater electoral progress in other
countries that have no such constitutional charter - for example, the
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands - it may have done less
than is assumed.
In other areas, the Charter era has either caused or coincided with
a considerable enhancement of women's legal rights - for example,
with regard to access to abortion and to protection against sexual
harassment in the workplace. However, the full enjoyment of these
rights apparently remains hostage to the effects of local social
structures and attitudes, labour market conditions, and government
social policies. This is particularly true in areas that are less
note 157. These results put all parties on the wrong side of public opinion,
according to which nine in ten Canadians support increasing the number of
women in elected office. Centre for Research and Information on Canada,
News Release, "Canadians More Confident in Political Leaders; Still Insist
Campaign Promises Must Be Kept" (4 November 2004), online: Queen's
University <http://www.queensu.ca/cora/polls/2OO4/November4-
canadiansmoreconfidant injpolitical leaders.pdf> [CRIC].
161 Erickson, ibid. at 238-39, 244-45. The NDP appears to consistently defy this
general trend.
162 Ibid. at 247. Interestingly, Erickson cites evidence from the year of the 1993
election that "[w]hile opinion about women in politics appeared to be
generally favourable, there was substantial sentiment in some quarters against
projects designed to increase women's representation," and that special
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amenable to rights-based arguments. Thus, while it was possible to
build abortion rights on a foundation of section 7 Charter promises
of "security of the person" and gender equality, there has been much
less progress with respect to equally fundamental needs such as
access to housing and child care - areas where the gendered impacts
of policy changes are just as keenly felt but in which Charter
remedies are unavailable because the Charter does not protect
economic rights.
Finally, of all equality-seeking groups, women have arguably
been the most assiduous and skilful in invoking the Charter. It is
worth noting that LEAF (Women's Legal Education and Action
Fund) - a leading advocacy group for women's rights - has been a
major architect of Charterjurisprudence. '63 Women are entering law
schools in increasing numbers (they now often comprise a majority
of entrants) and occupy more and more influential positions on the
bench and in the legal profession. 64 Several research centres,
163 Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, "Leaf Front and Centre at the
20th Anniversary of the Charter" (2002) 12:2 LEAFLINES 1, online:
<http://www.leaf.ca/leafines-spring2OO2.pdf>; Women's Legal Education &
Action Fund, Equality and the Charter: Ten Years of Feminist Advocacy
Before the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications Limited, 1996); Christopher P. Manfredi, Feminist Activism in
the Supreme Court: Legal Mobilization and the Women's Legal Education
and Action Fund (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004);
and Lise Gotell, Feminism, Equality Rights and the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in English Canada, 1980-1992: "The Radical Future of Liberal
Feminism?" (Ph.D. Thesis, York University, 1993) [unpublished].
164 At the University of Toronto, for instance, female law students outnumbered
men in four of the five academic years 1998 to 2003. Shirley Neuman,
Provost's Study of Accessibility and Career Choice in the Faculty of Law,
Presented to the Committee on Academic Policy and Programs of the
Governing Council of the University of Toronto, February 24, 2003 (26
March 2003), online: University of Toronto <http://www.newsandevents.
utoronto.ca/misc/lawaccess.pdf>. Nationwide, in 2000, more women were
called to the bar than men (1,530 compared to 1,308). Janice Mucalov,
"Women in Law" National 11: 5 (August-September 2002) 12 at 13
[Mucalov]. The number of women called to the bar in Ontario in the same
year was equal to that of men and exceeded it for the two years following.
Law Society of Upper Canada, "Law Society Honours Role Models at Call to
Bar Ceremonies" (26 March 2002), online: Canada NewsWire
<http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/February2002/ 22/c4512.html>.
Recent studies suggest that even in the legal realm, genuine equality remains
a distant goal. Although the quantity of women's participation has improved
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professorial chairs, academic organizations, andjournals now ensure
that women's issues receive the attention of skilled scholars in law
and associated policy disciplines. 5 But one should not simply
ssume that positive results flow from this apparent juridification of
the women's movement. On the one hand, similar or superior
progress towards women's equality has been observed in many
countries where no Charter equivalent exists, and where women
have successfully pursued strategies of social and political
mobilization rather than litigation strategies. On the other, Canadian
women have by no means confined their efforts to the legal arena,
and the nature of the interaction between legal and other strategies
remains to be investigated.' The struggle for gender equality in
Canada underlines how difficult it is to unravel Charter effects from
other developments and how careful one must be not to confuse high
levels of legal activity and success with measurable social progress.
C. Immigrants and Visible Minorities
While the experience of immigrant and minority groups differs
considerably, many appear to suffer greater economic disadvantage
relative to other Canadians than they did prior to the advent of the
Charter. A recent report by the CSJ Foundation surveying the
economic position of"racialized groups"' 67 reveals that employment
significantly, it appears that the quality of their experience continues to be
characterized by discrimination and relative powerlessness. See generally,
Mary Jane Mossman, "Gender Equality Education and the Legal Profession"
(2000) 12 (2d) Supreme Court Law Rev. 187. It may well be that even the
improvement in numbers alone has been chimerical: the persistence in law
firms of barriers to advancement and of a wage gap that worsens with
seniority has lead to an "exodus" of women leaving the practice of law "60%
more quickly than men." Mucalov, ibid. at 13.
1'65 See e.g., the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law. Several centres
devoted to feminist legal studies have come into being, such as the University
of British Columbia's Centre for Feminist Legal Studies and its Chair in
Feminist Legal Studies (established in 1992), York University's Institute for
Feminist Legal Studies, and Simon Fraser University's Feminist Institute for
Studies on Law and Society. The Ontario Bar Association now features a
practice section devoted to feminist legal analysis.
166 For a subtle investigation of this point in the American context, see Kostiner,
supra note 40.
167 The term corresponds to Statistics Canada's "visible minority" category,
which includes "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-
Caucasian in race or non-white in colour." Grace-Edward Galabuzi & CSJ
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earnings for these groups in 1995 were 15 percent lower than the
national average. Within these groups, those who arrived as
immigrants between 1986 and 1990 reported incomes 18 percent
lower than those of non-immigrants; those who arrived after 1990
earned 36 percent less than non-immigrants.6 6 This amounted to a
decrease in dollar amounts from $22,538 to $16,673.169 From 1996
to 1998, the difference in before-tax income of racialized groups
relative to non-racialized groups rose from 23 to 26 percent, while
the after-tax income difference rose from 20 percent in 1996 to 21
percent in 1997 and dropped again to 20 percent in 1998.17' The
report calculates that this gap has grown from about 2 percent for
those immigrating between 1966 and 1975 to 28 percent for the most
recent immigrants.' Although the national poverty level dropped
from 1986 to 1991, the number of distinct ethnocultural minority
groups suffering from poverty increased, while the percentage of
these groups experiencing unemployment rates higher than the
national average rose from 46 to 76 percent.'
Foundation for Research and Education, Canada's Creeping Economic
Apartheid: The Economic Segregation and Social Marginalization of
Racialized Groups,, (Toronto: CSJ Foundation for Research and Education,
2001) at 40 [Galabuzi & CSJ Foundation].
168 Ibid. at 47. For a useful breakdown of incomes one year after landing by
immigrant category and year of landing, see Elizabeth Ruddick, "Trends in
International Labour Flows to Canada: Statistics Canada Economic
Conference 2000" (2000), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/research/stats/labour/flows.pdf>. For a
detailed profile of the relative performance of immigrant categories, see
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "The Economic Performance of
Immigrants: Immigration Category Perspective" (1998), online: Citizenship
and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/papers/
category/category/b.html>. For a single time-point view of the economic
participation of recent immigrants as of 1996, see generally, Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, Canada's Recent Immigrants: A Comparative Portrait
Based on the 1996 Census (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and
Government Services, 2001), online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/
research-stats/1 996-Canada.pdf>.
169 Galabuzi & CSJ Foundation, supra note 167 at 39. The authors note further
that "[t]his gap also coincided with the general cutbacks in the levels of
government transfers, either in federal employment insurance benefits or
provincial social assistance benefits, during much of the 1990s."
"0 Ibid. at 40-42.
..' Ibid. at 47.
12 Ibid. at 51.
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Prospects for the most vulnerable immigrants - refugees - have
most certainly worsened since the 1980s. A 1998 report notes that
average earnings for refugees in their first full year after landing
have declined appreciably since 1988, and that this drop was not
related to the business cycle.' The earnings gap between all tax
filers (aged 35 to 44) and refugees upon landing increased by 35
percent from the 1980s to 1992.1 4 The decline in earnings observed
at the point at which they first acquire landed status persists through
subsequent years. The rate at which refugee earners close the gap
decreased throughout the 1980s so that "more recent cohorts have
been 'catching up' to all tax filers at a far slower rate than was
previously the case."'
'
Returning to the problem of racialized groups in general, data for
1998 reveal that earnings discrepancies are not merely the result of
the average lower education of such groups. While incomes were
higher for members of racialized groups with university educations
than for those without, the average difference in income between
those with higher education compared to their non-racialized
counterparts was actually higher (at 24 percent) than was the
difference between racialized and non-racialized persons with less
than high school education (22 percent). The median income
difference at both education levels was identical at 24 percent.
76
This is significant in light of the fact that data from 1991 and 1996
suggest that even racialized groups who reach higher average levels
of educational attainment than the general population are nonetheless
concentrated in clerical, service, and manual labour jobs. 7
1 The authors note that government-assisted refugees with paid employment had
average earnings of $10,534 at the depth of the 1982-1983 recession, while
earnings for the same group at the lowest point of the 1991-1993 recession had
declined to $6,260 in constant 1995 dollars. Citizenship and Immigration
Canada, "The Changing Labour Market Prospects of Refugees in Canada"
(March 1998), online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/papers/labour/
labour-toc.html>.
1 ibid.
175 Ibid. The report's authors speculate that the decrease in earnings might be
attributable to a combination of factors including a change of the countries of
origin or language abilities of recent refugee cohorts and changes in the
structure of the Canadian labour market.
176 Galabuzi & CSJ Foundation, supra note 167 at 43.
'1 Ibid. at 53. Visible minorities, both Canadian and foreign-born, across most
age categories completed post-secondary education in greater numbers in 1996
than in 1991. The percentage of Canadian-born minorities age 35-64 who
2005
Revue d'6tudes constitutionnelles
82 Does the Charter Matter?
Contrary to this last finding, Lautard and Guppy report that
"occupational dissimilarity" of visible minority groups from the rest
of the labour force actually decreased from 1981 to 1991. However,
while this improvement roughly coincided with the first decade of
the Charter, the authors demonstrate that it is in fact the continuation
of trends beginning as early as 1971.178 A more recent study, tracing
changes in status from 1991 to 1996, offers mixed conclusions.
79
Also inconclusive was the percentage of each group in the lowest
completed university rose from 26.6 to 32.3 percent, while foreign-born
minorities moved from 31 to 32.6 percent. By comparison, the percentage for
Canadian-born non-members of racial groups was 18.2 percent in 1991 and
by 1996 had still only reached 21 percent. Kunz, Milan & Schetagne, supra
note 65 at 16. Despite uniform improvements in educational attainment,
employment level trends for university graduates in this time period were
inconsistent across groups; the unemployment rate for Canadian-born visible
minorities dropped from 6.8 to 6.3 percent, while for foreign-born minorities
it began high at 9.3 percent and rose to 10.4 percent in 1996. Only Aboriginals
fared worse, beginning at 15.1 percent unemployment and ending at 16.5
percent, while Canadian-born non-members of racial groups dropped from 5
to 4.2 percent. Employment rates for visible minorities two years after
graduating from post-secondary studies were lower for visible minorities than
for non-members of racial groups in seven out of eight categories of study in
1992; by 1997, employment rates for minorities were lower in all eight
categories. Ibid. at 19-20.
178 Hugh Lautard & Neil Guppy, "Revisiting the Vertical Mosaic: Occupational
Stratification Among Canadian Ethnic Groups" in Peter S. Li, ed., Race and
Ethnic Relations in Canada, 2nd ed., (Don Mills: Oxford University Press,
1999) 219 at 235-41.
179 Although proportionately fewer Canadian- and foreign-born minorities could
be found at the senior- and middle-management category in 1996 than in
1991, the same could be said of non-members of racial groups, and the 1996
percentages for each group were comparable (10.2, 8.8, and 10 percent
respectively); evidently the number of positions in this category decreased, as
the percentage of persons in the category dropped for every racial group. The
proportion of each group in the professions increased, and for both years, a
higher proportion of Canadian-born visible minorities was employed in the
professions than for any other racial group, followed by non-members of
racialized groups, then by foreign-born visible minorities; Aboriginals had the
lowest concentration in the professions. The trends over time for both
categories of minority appear to mirror those of non-members of racialized
groups. Kunz, Milan & Schetagne, supra note 65 at 21.
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income quintile.' Racial minority participation in the public sector
showed some improvement, with visible minorities increasing their
share from 2.7 percent in 1987 to 5.1 percent in 1998'8' and
increasing their share of management and scientific/professional
positions within the public service.' Progress in federally regulated
industries was also observed between 1989 and 1994. 13A detailed
analysis reveals, however, that as of 1995, minority representation
in public-sector operational and technical positions was still only at
1.8 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. This last figure is equal to
the minority share of executive positions as reported by the same
study.' 4 By comparison, visible minorities constituted between 9.4
percent and 11.2 percent of the general population.'
There are some indications that racial discrimination has indeed
decreased in the era of Charter-entrenched equality and
multiculturalism. Reitz and Breton report that, while a Henry and
Ginsberg study in 1984 revealed that a black job applicant in
Toronto was five times more likely to be told the position was filled
180 While Canadian-born non-members of racial groups were generally less
concentrated here than were Canadian or foreign-born visible minorities
regardless of educational attainment, the percentage difference ranged from
less than 1 percent in some categories at some times to as much as 11 percent
at others. It is worth noting, however, that from 1991 to 1996 the
concentration of Canadian-born non-members of racial groups in the lowest
quintile decreased at the highest and lowest levels of educational attainment,
while it increased for both categories of visible minority. Ibid. at 23.
181 Bakan, Kobayashi & SWC, supra note 60 at 67.
182 1.9 percent and 7.6 percent respectively in 1989 to 2.8 percent and 10.1
percent in 1998. Ibid. at 68.
183 Minority share of positions in banking rose slightly from 12.1 to 13.7 percent,
in communications from 5.3 to 7.2 percent, in transportation from 3.8 to 4.3
percent, and in 'other' industries (including metal and coal mines, petroleum
and natural gas, and industrial chemicals) from 3.7 to 6.2 percent. Samuel &
Karam, supra note 60 at 146-48.
18 Ibid. at 140. Significantly, the authors of this study do not link progress in
employment to the Charter, but attribute it instead to the increase of third-
world immigration in the 1970s, to the U.S. civil rights movement, and to the
1984 Abella Report and subsequent changes to equity legislation in 1986 and
1995. Ibid. at 134-37.
185 These figures are taken from the 1991 and 1996 census, respectively. Statistics
Canada, "Proportion of Visible Minorities, Canada, Montr6al, Toronto and
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after a white applicant was invited for an interview, the discrepancy
had disappeared by the time of a 1989 follow-up study."6 They also
report a shift in Canadian public opinion with respect to black-white
marriages, with disapproval waning from 52 percent in 1968 to 35
percent in 1973 and 16 percent in 1988. The authors generalize that
these figures represent a drop of roughly 2 percent per year"7
suggesting that while tolerance increased during the Charter period,
there was nothing conspicuous about the rate at which it did so
relative to the decade that preceded it.'
Other measures defy generalization about progress in racial
tolerance. Public preference with respect to models of racial
integration changed over the Charter period in a fashion that is not
only unexpected, but contrary to the intention of section 27, which
explicitly valorizes the "preservation and enhancement of the
multicultural heritage of Canadians." Thus, support for a "mosaic"
model dropped from 56 percent in 1985 to 44 percent in 1995, while
the popularity of the "melting pot" model increased from 27 to 40
percent. 89 The perception that various ethnic groups have "too much
power" increased uniformly from 1985 to 1995 with respect to every
group except whites (who were perceived to have become
significantly less powerful from 1990 to. 1995) and East
Indians/Pakistanis (against whom the sentiment rose dramatically
from 15 percent in 1985 to 22 percent 1990, dropping to 18 percent
186 The authors caution the reader, however, that in 1989 the demand for labour
was much greater than in 1984, and that "heavy labor demand often
temporarily improves the opportunities for disadvantaged groups." Jeffrey G.
Reitz & Raymond Breton, "Prejudice and Discrimination in Canada and the
United States: A Comparison" in Vic Satzewich, ed., Racism and Social
Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance
(Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing Inc., 1998) 47 at 60-6 1.
187 Reitz & Breton, ibid. at 59-60.
188 Indeed, the Charter does not figure in the overall examination. A comparative
look at the U.S. and Canada suggests that "blatant racism is marginal and the
social distance between racial minorities and other groups is diminishing"
equally in both countries "despite the historical differences between race
relations in Canada and race relations in the United States." Ibid. at 65.
Among these differences, of course, would be the different eras in which
racial equality was constitutionally entrenched in each country.
189 Leo Driedger & Angus Reid, "Public Opinion on Visible Minorities" in
Driedger & Halli, supra note 60, 152 at 165.
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in 1995).'90 General public perception of the existence of racial
discrimination rose from 55 percent in 1980 to 67 percent by 1995,
but "feelings of uneasiness" among Canadians with respect to
minority groups decreased from 1975 to 1995.' 9' More recent
surveys trace a "substantial recovery" in public perception of the
impact of immigration on employment levels by 1997-1998 (i.e., a
decrease in "fears that immigration was exacerbating the scarcity of
employment opportunities"), as well as increased support for higher
levels of immigration. 92 In the same vein, resistance to "non-white"
immigration "dwindled" between 1989 and 1996.'9' However, there
is considerable regional variation in these results. 94
'90 Ibid. at 170. Though data before 1980 are not available for most groups, the
available data suggests that for some groups the advent of the Charter
coincided with the reversal or halting of a trend in which figures had been
dropping since 1975. The perception that "natives" had too much power
dropped from 7 to 6 percent in this time, then more than doubled to 13 percent
by 1985 and again to 33 percent in 1995. For Jews, the sentiment dropped
markedly from 28 percent to 13 percent by 1985, after which it remained static
with a slight increase to 14 percent by 1995.
19' Ibid. at 167. The "feelings of uneasiness" measure relies on data from 1975
to 1995 collected at five-year intervals; this data reveals no consistent
correlation with the pronouncement or coming into force of Charter equality
provisions. While East Indians/Pakistanis and Natives experienced their
largest drops in uneasiness from 1980 to 1985, blacks' greatest improvement
occurred over the five years prior to 1980, and all groups represented except
for East Indians/Pakistanis have experienced brief upsurges in uneasiness at
various times over the course of the Charter era.
192 The authors note these improvements paralleled "substantial improvements in
the unemployment figures over the same period," just as the recession of the
early 1990s had lead to a "marked erosion of levels policy support."
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Executive Summary - A Detailed
Regional Analysis of Perceptions of Immigration in Canada" (June 1998),
online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/papers/regional.html>.
193 This represented a drop in the "already-small minority of respondents
endorsing racist exclusionary practices." Ibid.
194 Ibid. A later report finds that support for current immigration policy levels
(i.e., the degree to which respondents feel levels are too high or too low, as
opposed to support for either higher or lower levels) is negatively correlated
with higher regional rates of immigration, and that this correlation is
weakened somewhat by improved economic conditions. Douglas L. Palmer
for Strategic Policy Planning and Research, Citizenship and Immigration
Canada, "Executive Summary - Canadian Attitudes and Perceptions
Regarding Immigration: Relations with Regional Per Capita Immigration and
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Political representation of ethno-cultural groups and visible
minorities has improved in the Charter period, though with some
exceptions and contrary trends. In 1991, the Royal Commission on
Electoral Reform reported that the number and percentage share of
seats in the House of Commons had improved for both ethnic and
visible minorities, though not evenly (the percentage of ethnic
minorities rose from 9.4 percent in 1965 to 16.3 percent in 1988,
while for visible minorities the change was from 0 percent to just 2
percent).'95 The report does not comment on the effect of the
Charter, and the progression of numbers suggests no appreciable
acceleration in the early Charter years through 1988. Jerome Black
suggests that the situation had improved somewhat by the 1993
election, in which thirteen visible minority candidates won seats in
the Commons compared to just ten in total for the previous eight
elections. He notes, however, that even at this number, "visible
minorities remained dramatically under-represented in Parliament"
when their share of seats (4.4 percent) was compared to their share
of the population (9.8 percent, according to 1991 census data).' 96 As
only two of those successful minority candidates were women, it has
been observed that visible-minority women remain particularly
under-represented. '97 Marginal numerical gains were made with the
1997 election of nineteen candidates from visible minority
backgrounds, representing 6.3 percent of seats in the House, but by
this point in time visible minorities comprised 11.2 percent of the
total population. 19'
The impact of the Charter for immigrants and racial minority
Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/papers/
perceptions.html>.
195 Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Ethno-
Cultural Groups and Visible Minorities in Canadian Politics: The Question
ofAccess vol. 7 (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party
Financing and Canada Communications Group - Publishing, Supply and
Services Canada and Dundurn Press, 1991) at 130.
l9 Jerome H. Black, "Representation in the Parliament of Canada: The Case of
Ethnoracial Minorities" [Black] in Joanna Everitt & Brenda O'Neill, eds.,
Citizen Politics: Research and Theory in Canadian Political Behaviour (Don
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002) 355 at 359-60 (Everitt & O'Neill].
197 Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "Challenging the Gendered Vertical Mosaic:
Immigrants, Ethnic Minorities, Gender, and Political Participation" in Everitt
& O'Neill, ibid. 268 at 272.
1" Black, supra, note 196 at 361.
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groups has been equivocal. Improvements in their position since
adoption of the Charter often simply followed the trajectory of
longer-running historical trends that antedated it. Moreover,
evidence of such improvements is often inconclusive or
contradictory. For example, racial minorities and immigrants
participate in various occupations more frequently than before, but
overall income disparity between them and the rest of the population
appears to be increasing. Or, to cite another example, as racial
discrimination wanes, more members of minority groups are finding
their way to political office, but the next generation of immigrants is
having a harder time getting into Canada than previous cohorts.199
D. Gays and Lesbians
As we have suggested, for most equality-seeking constituencies
the Charter era has not been a period of measurable advances.
Arguably, however, the Charter did confer important but non-
quantifiable gains - in rights, dignity, respect and acceptance - on at
least some groups. Gays and lesbians, who only a decade ago were
acknowledged as an "analogous group" entitled to Charter
protection,"' may be one such group. On the other hand, their
position may differ from that of the other equality-seeking groups we
have identified in two respects.
First, gays and lesbians, unlike members of other groups
protected by the Charter, are not visually obvious. Thus, those who
chose to self-identify or were stereotyped almost certainly suffered
overt discrimination, harassment by police and other officials, and
deprivation of various rights and benefits. These are the kinds of
harms whose post-Charter fluctuations we have attempted to chart.
However, an unknown, but likely significant, proportion of gays and
lesbians escaped overt victimization by remaining "invisible" both
visually and statistically. We have to acknowledge, therefore, that
our methodology cannot capture the total pre- or post-Charter
experience of this or similar equality-seeking groups.
Second, accepting that gays and lesbians have indeed achieved
both quantifiable and non-quantifiable gains since 1982, it is difficult
'99 See part V below.
200 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [Egan]; riend v. Alberta, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 493; and M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 [M. v. H.].
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to determine whether or to what extent these gains can be attributed
to the Charter, to Human Rights Codes and other legislative
interventions,"1 or simply to reductions in homophobic attitudes that
can be observed in many socially emancipated countries such as
Denmark, which decriminalized homosexual relations between
consenting adults in 1933, and the United Kingdom, which did so in
1967 (two years before Canada in 1969), or Belgium, Holland, and
Spain, all of which gave legislative approval to same-sex marriage
slightly in advance of Canada. Nor can social, political, and legal
developments be easily disaggregated one from the other. High-
profile Charter judgments may indeed embolden or even compel
legislators to dismantle legal forms of discrimination - as in the case
of same-sex marriages 2 - but such judgments may themselves
result from changing social attitudes that allow or encourage judges
to abandon old taboos and legitimate new forms of social relations.
Moreover, such attitudinal changes do not necessarily occur
spontaneously. They may be provoked by social activism, made
poignant by literary or dramatic representations, and valorized by
media exposure and discussion.
Does the Charter, then, matter to gays and lesbians in the sense
in which we have been asking that question throughout this essay?
What is the significance of the fact that they have made gains equal
to or greater than those in some countries with no Charter equivalent
or, like the United States, with different litigation outcomes? Are
gays and lesbians less susceptible than other equality-seeking groups
to the forces of political economy whose power we discuss in the
201 Human Rights legislation in a number of Canadian jurisdictions was amended
to provide protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation before
the Supreme Court's decision in Egan (ibid.), which extended Charter
protection to gays and lesbians. See e.g., An Act to amend certain Ontario
Statutes to conform to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, S.O. 1986, c. 64, s. 18; Human Rights Amendment Act, 1992,
S.B.C. 1992, c. 43, ss. 2-7; An Act to Amend the Human Rights Act, S.N.B.
1992, c. 30, ss. 1, 3-8; An Act to Amend Chapter 214 of the Revised Statutes,
1989, the Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1991, c. 12, s. 5.
202 Following a favourable response to its reference to the Supreme Court in
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75; [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698,
the federal government passed The Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33,
which expands the common-law definition of "civil marriage" to include
same-sex couples.
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conclusions of this essay? We do not know the answer to these
questions, but certainly view them as appropriate for further inquiry.
V. LEGAL AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: PROTECTION
AGAINST ABUSE BY STATE OFFICIALS
Charter protections for legal rights have given rise to considerable
controversy. Since such protections are most often invoked in
criminal proceedings, the Charter is perceived to have shifted the
balance towards protecting the rights of the accused and away from
ensuring the effective operation of the justice system. Typically,
critics of the Charter claim that under its influence conviction rates
have decreased, that those who are convicted are dealt with less
harshly, and that the public is exposed, as a result, to a greater risk
of harm from criminal activity. These are striking claims, and one
would expect them to be supported by some kind of persuasive
evidence. However, not only is such evidence lacking, but some
scholars maintain that during the Charter era the state has become
neither less efficient nor more reticent about locking up society's
undesirables. Michael Mandel demonstrates, for instance, that
despite the enlarged procedural protections that Oakes.. supposedly
afforded persons accused of drug offences, convictions under the
Narcotic ControlAce" did not diminish during the Charter era. On
the contrary, convictions for possession for the purposes of
trafficking rose by 19 percent from 1982 to 1986, while convictions
for trafficking and for possession rose by 28.9 percent and 78.3
percent respectively. ° Moreover, the length of sentences and the
rigour of probation conditions also increased steadily from the mid-
1970s, 2°6 while prison sentences in the 1980s were the longest in
Canadian history. At the institutional level, Mandel reports, the
203 R. v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (S.C.C.)
204 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-i (Repealed, 1996, c. 19, s. 94).
205 Mandel, supra note 6 at 196-97. In 2002, the police-reported rate of total drug
offences continued a nine-year climb, due in part to the advent of new
synthetic substances but also to an increase in cannabis offences, which
constituted three in four drug incidents that year. Most cannabis-related
offences were for simple possession, the incidence of which had doubled since
1991. The 93,000 drug incidents reported in 2002 constituted a 3 percent
increase over the previous year and marked a twenty-year high. Statistics
Canada, "The Daily: Crime Statistics" (24 July 2003), online:
<http://www.statscan.ca/Daily/English/030724/d030724a.htm>.
206 Mandel, supra note 6 at 220.
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National Parole Board was invested with new powers that resulted
in the proportion of the population under criminal sentence
restrictions outstripping by fourfold the Depression-era figure.0 7 The
number of police per capita has also grown which, as Mandel notes,
might itself account for much of the increase in reported crime.20 8 In
somewhat similar fashion, the Askov2 "9 decision (in which a section
11 (a) Charter challenge resulted in the dismissal of 50,000 pending
criminal charges) created political pressure in Ontario for spending
increases of $86 million per year from 1989 to 1992, in order to
build new courtrooms and appoint additional judges and Crown
prosecutors.2 '0 During roughly the same period, far from falling
because of the supposed effect of "accused-friendly" Charter
rulings, the prison population increased by 27 percent and the
probation population by 30 percent. 1
207 Ibid. at 220-21.
208 Ibid. at 221.
209 R. v. Askov (1990), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 449 [Askov].
210 Mandel, supra note 6 at 226-27.
211 Ibid. at 227. According to the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, federal
justice spending (in constant 1986 dollars), which had decreased significantly
from 1983-1984 to 1985-1986 and remained at this level for several years,
rose once again to its 1983-1984 level in 1991-1992, where it remained before
dropping from 1993-1994 to 1994-1995. Interestingly, while Mandel attributes
increased justice spending in Ontario in the early 1990s to the Askov fallout,
increased federal spending on the justice system at the same point in time
mirrored federal increases in health and social services, which followed the
same brief arc described above between 1991 and 1995. Though total justice
spending followed this pattern, its constituent parts did not: spending (in
current dollars) on police increased steadily from 1985-1996 at around $3.3
billion to level off at $5.8 billion in 1994-1995. Court costs also climbed
steadily from over $600 million in 1988-1999 to peak at under $900 million
by 1992-1993 and drop gradually to just over $800 million in 1994-1995.
Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, The Juristat Reader: A Statistical
Overview of the Canadian Justice System (Toronto: Thompson Educational
Publishing, 1999) at 5-7. Following the decline in 1994-1995, total justice
spending increased over the next several years, though not dramatically, from
just under $10 billion in 1996-1997 to $11.1 billion by 2000-2001. The bulk
of this expense continued to be related to policing, which over the same period
rose from approximately $5.9 billion to $6.8 billion. The cost of courts rose
from $859 million to over $1 billion, while spending on prosecutions climbed
from $265 million to $335 million. The only area ofjustice spending in which
federal expenses decreased over the five-year period was in contributions to
legal aid plans, which dropped sharply from $536 million in 1996-1997 to
$455 million the following year, and gradually increased over the remaining
Vol. 11, No. 1
Review of Constitutional Studies
Harry Arthurs and Brent Arnold 91
A more recent examination by Kent Roach argues that the long-
term effect of Charter legal rights and the resulting focus on due
process has been to increase the efficiency and legitimacy of plea
bargaining, which he argues is typical of a "crime-control model" of
justice - the most repressive of the models in his taxonomy. 12 Roach
describes the overall effect of the Charter as an increase in crime
control; for instance, when courts invalidated warrantless searches
under Charter as unreasonable, legislatures responded by making
them legal.21 3 Prison counts increased by 50 percent and other forms
of punishment by 60 percent in the first ten years of the Charter, and
imprisonment rates under the Young Offenders Ac? 4 increased
despite a public perception of leniency resulting from the act.215 He
period to reach $512 million in 2000-2001. Statistics Canada, "Justice
Spending," online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statscan.ca/english/
Pgdb/legal 13.htm>. This drop reversed a decade-long trend that had seen legal
aid spending more than triple from 1984-1985 to 1994-1995. Canadian Centre
for Justice Statistics, ibid. at 9.
212 Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims'Rights: The New Law and Politics of
Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 113 [Roach,
Due Process].
213 Ibid. at 313.
214 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 (Repealed, 2002, c. 1, s. 199) (Young Offenders Act].
215 Roach, Due Process, supra note 212 at 313. A recent survey of twenty years'
data suggests that the average rate of apprehended youths actually charged by
police was 27 percent higher from 1986-1996 than in the 1980-1983 period,
a jump the authors suggest was directly attributable to the introduction of the
Young Offenders Act and a consequent "reduction in the use by police of
informal means - that is, in police discretion" in dealing with young offenders.
Peter J. Carrington, "Trends in Youth Crime in Canada, 1977-1996" (1999)
41 Canadian J. of Criminology 1 at 18. See also Peter J. Carrington, "Changes
in Police Charging of Young Offenders in Ontario and Saskatchewan after
1984" (1998) 40 Canadian J. of Criminology 153. Comparative survey data
reveals that for the period 1995 to 1998 youths were more likely to be
convicted of at least one charge per case than were adults, and were more
likely to receive custodial sentences. John Howard Society of Alberta, "Harsh
Reality of the Young Offenders Act" (1999), online:
<http://www.johnhoward.ab.ca/res-pub.htm#post> at 2. For each of these
years, the majority of adults convicted received custodial sentences of less
than one month, while an even greater majority of young offenders were
sentenced to one-to-six months' custody. Ibid. at 5. This discrepancy may be
accounted for in part by the fact that custodial sentences are often used by
courts as a means of rescuing young offenders from homelessness or
precarious home lives, but it also stems from the indeterminacy of the Act
itself, which "does not provide a consistent statement of [its] intent in its
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notes generally that the actual impact of Askov in terms of amnesty
for criminals was smaller than reported, since in many cases several
of the charges dismissed were against the same individuals"1 6 and
that the "due process revolution" did not lead to the
decriminalization of "victimless crimes."
217
Indeed, the dynamic of the criminal justice system, even during
a period of dramatic Charter litigation, may be largely uninfluenced
by legal developments. This seems, at least, to be the working
hypothesis of a 2001 report by the Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics. The report - which does not even mention the Charter or
legal rights - instead probes for correlations between criminal
statistics and environmental factors including unemployment,
education, divorce rates, population density, and migration.18 While
such correlations are not easily established (as will be seen below),
many statistical indicators - including crime rates, conviction rates,
legal aid applications, and incarceration rates - exhibit a singular
trend. The total crime rate fluctuates throughout the Charter era but
peaks dramatically around 1991 2 9 Criminal charges against youths
follow the same pattern.221 "Clearance rates" - offences resulting in
the laying of charges - follow the general pattern described above,
Declaration of Principle. Consequently, youth court judges have had more
freedom since the introduction of the Young Offenders Act to sentence youths
based on a multitude of conflicting principles." Ibid. at 9. See also John
Howard Society of Alberta, "Youth Crime in Canada: Public Perception vs.
Statistical Information" (1998), online: <http://www.johnhoward.ab.ca/res-
pub.htm#post>.
216 Roach, Due Process, ibid. at 92-93.
217 Soliciting, hate propaganda, pornography, gambling, drugs, and suicide stayed
on the books; abortion is an exception to this, having narrowly avoided
recriminalization following Morgentaler, supra note 140. Ibid. at 148-50.
218 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics & Statistics Canada, Graphical
Overview of the Criminal Justice Indicators 2000-2001 (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 2001) at 67-75 [CCJS & Statistics Canada]. These are presented in
a series of graphs without analysis or interpretation, as are the criminal justice
statistics.
219 Property crimes in particular mirror the general trend, though violent crimes
instead rise steadily from 1977 through to 2001. Ibid. at 2. For actual number
of charges against adults per year, see ibid. at 14. Despite the steady increase
in violent crime, the homicide rate, while fluctuating greatly, ends the period
lower than it began, having stood at 3/100,000 compared to just over 1.75 by
2001. Ibid. at 4.
220 Ibid. at 10-12.
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although they peak slightly earlier, with the highest number of
charges per 100,000 occurring in 1989 (nearly 25,000). A steady
decline from 1983 through 2001 in charges for crimes involving
property is offset by steady increases in charges for violent and other
crimes."' Applications for legal aid begin at around 600,000 in
1983-1984, crest to nearly 1,200,000 by 1992-1993, and drop to over
800,000 by 2000-2001. Application acceptance levels mirror this
trajectory, although by the period's end successful applications as a
percentage of applications appears to have dropped.222
On the other hand, some indicators do vary from the general
pattern. Average probation counts, which peak at around 100,000 per
year in 1992-1993, do not subside; they stay high through the
decade, reaching their highest level at about 110,000 in 1997-
1998.223 Average counts of "actual-in" federal inmates rise steadily
throughout most of the Charter era.224 Interestingly, the numbers of
cases heard and of cases resulting in "guilty" verdicts both dropped
steadily from 1994-1995 to 2000-2001.225 The number of admissions
to provincial correctional institutions also departs from the general
pattern in that it declines over the Charter period. However, the rate
of remand admissions (or persons waiting trial) generally begins
much lower than the sentenced rate in 1978-1979 (approximately
56,000) and increases throughout the pre-Charter and Charter
periods. The end result, in which remand admissions (118,566)
exceeded sentence admissions (80,928) by 2000-2001, stands in
stark contrast to 1982-1983, when there were more than twice as
many sentenced admissions as remanded.22 6 Average counts of adults
in provincial institutions show the same pattern, a growing contrast
between sentenced and remanded inmates. 2" Provincial and
territorial rates of sentenced and remand incarceration follow a
similar trajectory to those at the federal level, in that the sentenced
rate peaks in 1992-1993 and declines through to 2000-2001, while
the remand rate rises consistently from 1986-1987 through to 2000-
2' Ibid. at 19.
222 Ibid. at 37.
223 Ibid. at 62.
224 Ibid. at 59.
225 The total number of cases dropped from 446,086 to 375,466 while the number
resulting in "guilty" verdicts began at 270,874 and ended at 226,979. Ibid. at
22.
n26 Ibid. at 54.
227 Ibid. at 56.
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2001. This change amounts to a 37 percent increase in the proportion
of total incarcerations due to remands, and a 75 percent increase in
the number of remand incarcerations over the bulk of the Charter
period. Remand admissions matched sentenced by 1996-1997 and
have continued to increase as sentenced admissions have declined.2
The duration of time spent on remand also increased steadily from
1990-1991 to 2000-2001, and the proportion of remand times
exceeding three months has more than doubled.229 Overall,
environmental and demographic factors appear to offer few
compelling explanations for the crime trends described above.230
Assuming the Charter is indeed also irrelevant to the changes in
crime statistics, the only exogenous factors remaining would seem
to be shifts in the politics and administrative practice of policing.3
Anecdotal, rather than statistical evidence may, however, suggest
a new hypothesis. In some respects the Charter era, far from
witnessing enhanced respect for the newly entrenched "principles
of fundamental justice" (section 7), has arguably coincided with a
retreat from those principles. Royal commissions, public inquiries,
and academic commentators, for example, have documented
significant instances of police abuse.232 Force has been heavy-
228 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, "Juristat: Custodial Remand in Canada,
1986/87 to 2000/01" (7 November 2003), online: Statistics Canada
<http://www.statscan.ca> at 6-7.
229 Ibid. at 12. For individual provincial and territorial remand and sentenced
figures, see ibid. at 18-19.
230 The unemployment rate for men, for example, does peak around 1992 to 1993
as does the crime rate; however, even higher peaks are seen in 1983 and 1997,
when crime rates were comparatively much lower than in 1992-1993.
Economic performance (measured here in terms of gross domestic product),
often linked inversely with criminal activity, did improve from 1993 to 2001
as the crime rate dropped, though there is no dip in performance by 2001 to
account for the slight upturn in crime in the same year. The divorce rate bears
no correlation to crime rates in general, having peaked in 1987 and dropped
steadily through to 1997 as the total crime rate was rising. The rate of children
born to teenagers was also in decline as crime rates peaked. Population growth
in urban centres increased consistently from 1992 to 2000 but did not reach
its most dramatic rate until 1995, by which time crime was in decline. CCJS
& Statistics Canada, supra note 218 at 67-74.
231 See 51-52, above.
232 Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution &
T. A. Hickman, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution:
Digest of Findings and Recommendations (Halifax, N.S.: The Commission,
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handedly deployed to control and disrupt peaceful political
demonstrations."' The post-9/l1 security state has become
1989); Ontario Human Rights Commission, Paying the Price: The Human
Cost of Racial Profiling - Inquiry Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights
Commission, 2003); AFN, "Socio-Economic Exclusion," supra note 58;
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System,
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice
System (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1995); and Toni Williams,
"Racism in Justice: The Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the
Ontario Criminal Justice System" in Susan C. Boyd, Dorothy E. Chunn &
Robert J. Menzies, eds., (Ab)Using Power: The Canadian Experience
(Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Company Limited, 2001) 200. As of2002, The
Association for the Defence of the Wrongly Convicted (AIDWYC) reported
no fewer than thirty-five exonerated and pending cases of wrongful
conviction. Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted, "The
Innocence File" (2002) 2 The AIDWYC Journal 8, online:
<http://www.aidwyc.org/ Journal2.pdf> at 8. Among the most common factors
in cases of wrongful conviction: a "[h]igh level of community pressure on the
police to apprehend a suspect," and "'tunnel vision' in the investigation."
Lawrence Greenspon, "Disclosure of Evidence" (2002) 2 The AIDWYC
Journal 10, online: <http://www.aidwyc.org/Journal2.pdf> at 10.
233 See generally, W. Wesley Pue, ed., Pepper in Our Eyes: The APEC Affair
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000); Canada,
Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP & E. N. Hughes,
Commission Interim Report Following a Public Hearing into the Complaints
Regarding the Events That Took Place in Connection with Demonstrations
During the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Vancouver,
B.C. in November 1997 at the UBC Campus and at the UBC and Richmond
Detachments of the RCMP (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and
Government Services, 2001). Commissioner Hughes was critical of the extent
to which security concerns may infringe Charter freedoms:
[N]either the federal government nor the RCMP may curtail political
criticism by protesters. The right to express political views lies at the
very core of the freedom of expression provided for in the Charter.
The fact that a visiting leader may be merely upset or angered by the
expression of contrary political views and criticism by Canadians
does not justify the suppression of such expression.
Quoted in Trevor C.W. Farrow, "Negotiation, Mediation, Globalization
Protests and Police: Right Processes; Wrong System, Issues, Parties and
Time" (2003) 28 Queen's Law J. 665 at 687. As Farrow notes, despite these
findings, even the most peaceful of the subsequent international meetings
continued the trend of constitutionally indefensible measures:
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entrenched in legislation (though not yet subjected to Charter
challenges),234 and increasing police militancy has both undermined
attempts at civilian control of abuse and encouraged "law and order
politics" at the very moment when falling crime rates might have
justified more lenient public policies. 3
[V]iolation of freedom of expression is exactly what occurred at the
June 2002 G8 Summit in Alberta. Given the indiscriminate breadth
of the Summit shutdown and the resulting total inability of protesters
to gain any kind of meaningful access to the Summit meeting sites,
this shutdown was likely, at least in part, an unconstitutional
infringement of speech and assembly.Toronto Video Activist
Collective, Tear Gas Holiday: Qu6bec City Summit 2001, Jungli
Seiko, Mari Leesmen & Malcolm Rogge, eds., (Toronto: TVAC,
2003).
234 Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41. Scholars have pointed to the potential of
this legislation to interfere with civil rights. See Sujit Choudhry & Kent
Roach, "Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion, Constitutional
Remedies, and Democratic Accountability" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law J.
1; Reem Bahdi, "No Exit: Racial Profiling and Canada's War against
Terrorism" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law J. 293; and W. Wesley Pue, "The
War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare?"
(2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law J. 267 [Pue]. In addition, a recent Canadian Bar
Association report documented the almost-immediate use of the new
legislation by law enforcement agencies to justify the criminalization of
political dissent and racial profiling. See International Civil Liberties
Monitoring Group (ICLMG), "In the Shadow of the Law: A Report by the
International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG) in response to
Justice Canada's 1st annual report on the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act
(Bill C-36)" (14 May 2003), online: Canadian Bar Association
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/PDF/Shadow.pdf>, cited in Pue, ibid. at n.
11 [ICLMG].
235 Dianne Martin documents a case in which 192 files "alleging serious
misconduct" against members of the Metro Toronto Police Force escaped
scrutiny because the Metro Police's Internal Affairs "routinely failed to notify
the Police Complaints Commissioner" when complaints were received, in a
bid to "drastically limit the scope of the PCC to inquire into misconduct" via
"[i]nternally developed practices and procedures, designed to ensure that the
vast majority of serious allegations of misconduct would be beyond civilian
review." Ray Kuszelewski & Dianne L. Martin, "The Perils of Poverty:
Prostitutes' Rights, Police Misconduct, and Poverty Law" (1997) 35:4
Osgoode Hall Law J. 835 at 857. An American scholar who documents the
draconian punishments for criminal youth involved in the drug epidemic of the
1980s notes with respect to analogous provisions under Canadian law that a
decrease in violent crime and in the drug trade in the late 1990s had largely
eliminated the need for such laws: "People have reason to feel safer. At least
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We earlier suggested that we would not try to demonstrate causal
relations between the adoption of the Charter and the developments
in the areas of Canada's social and political life that it was meant to
address. However, these anecdotes, along with data presented above,
at least suggest the need to investigate an hypothesis: that the
Charter era not only coincided with a toughening of attitudes,
policies and behaviours in the criminal justice system, but may
actually have caused them. Mandel, for one, suggests that the
Charter-based ruling in Askov in the late 1980s may have triggered
an increase in state expenditure on the criminal justice system, which
in turn may have had the short-term effect of increasing the Ontario
prison and probation population. Such changes fuel a perceived
increase in crime, which in turn provides a justification for
repressive crime-control strategies. Bogart's examination of capital
punishment in the United States suggests a similar punitive logic at
work:
There are myriad complaints that the spreading of rights, including
through the courts, has not been accompanied by a corresponding
observance of responsibilities. Perhaps the criminal justice system,
administered by the courts, has become the misplaced repository for an
unfocused but determined insistence on such responsibility. If individuals
have so many rights, then they alone are responsible for their criminal acts
- and deserve to be punished, to lose their freedom.236
If this hypothesis can be sustained, the real-life consequences of
the Charter would seem to have been to leave citizens more, rather
than less, exposed to abuse and injustice. What an irony if indeed it
should turn out that the Charter may have confounded both the fears
of "law and order" hard-liners and the hopes of idealistic advocates
of procedural due process.
the objective conditions for tough-on-crime, send-them-to-prison approach
have been undermined." Wayne N. Renke, "Sensible Justice: Alternatives to
Prison, by David C. Anderson," Book Review of Sensible Justice:
Alternatives to Prison by David C. Anderson (1999) 37 Alberta Law Rev. 823
at 827. A Canadian author notes that neoconservative denunciations of the
perceived "appalling" increase in violent crime as a justification for the
"predictable litany of needed get tough reforms" blatantly overlook the fact
that, "rather than demonstrating a troubling increase, crime rates generally
have declined steadily for the past several years." Dianne L. Martin,
"Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform
Strategies" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall Law J. 151.
236 Bogart, Consequences, supra note 43 at 161.
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Of course, not all infringements of citizens' legal rights occur
within the criminal justice system. Other domains of state action
may be sites of equally egregious violations. Indeed, it is possible to
argue that while the criminal justice system deals with a relatively
small "clientele," a much greater number of Canadians experience
the coercive power of the state in their encounters with various
public bureaucracies that determine the quality of their daily lives.
Thus, the way in which people are treated by welfare officers, tax
collectors, immigration officials, health departments and school
boards may ultimately determine the quality of their "life, liberty
and [the] security of [their] persons" - the substantive interests
sought to be protected by "the principles of fundamental justice"
whose application is mandated by the Charter.237
Once again, we are in no position to offer statistics or, for that
matter, even anecdotal evidence. At best, we can suggest two
hypotheses that may be worth investigating. The first is that worthy
state projects - designed to promote Charter values or other
progressive and humanitarian ideals - may falter or fail because they
are badly conceived, designed, administered, or funded. Human
rights commissions, for example, are often overwhelmed by huge
caseloads, in part because their efforts have publicized the
availability of recourse to "clients" who previously thought they had
none."8 In addition, like any agency with finite resources, they
237 Charter, supra note 1, s. 7.
238 The most comprehensive recent account of human rights commissions in
Canada documents the expansion of commission caseloads over several
decades, attributing growth to the continual increase in legislation protecting
human rights, expansive judicial interpretations of these protections, and the
increase in responsibilities entrusted to commissions over time. The authors
note that the Ontario commission processed only forty-five cases in its
inaugural year (1962-1963), but by the late 1970s the number exceeded 1,000
and had passed 2,500 per year by the mid-1990s. R. Brian Howe & David
Johnson, Restraining Equality: Human Rights Commissions in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 71 [Howe & Johnson]. As of
March 2003, this figure stood at 2,137. Ontario Human Rights Commission,
Annual Report 2002-2003 (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission,
2003), online: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/eftglish/publications/index.shtml> at
6 [Howe & Johnson]. While several provincial commissions experienced
fluctuations in caseload over the course of the Charter era, most were
handling considerably more cases by 1996-1997 than in 1982-1983 (with only
Manitoba handling fewer; interestingly, Quebec's commission, while handling
nominally more cases at the end of this period than at the beginning,
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assign priorities to some initiatives over others. Since they find it
difficult to turn away individual complainants, they typically focus
their attention and energy on processing and prosecuting such
complaints. Thus, a pattern often emerges: strategic educational
programs or systemic interventions are sacrificed;239 individual
complaints grow to the point where they cannot be dealt with
promptly; delays engender public and political criticism; pressures
mount to clear the backlog; and the commission responds by
dismissing marginal claims or diverting them to other fora, by
pressuring complainants to accept settlements, and by avoiding
complex litigation that might settle issues of principle. In the end,
ironically, the human rights commission itself comes to be regarded
with suspicion by its "clients" and with dismay by its natural allies
in government or civil society, accused of neglecting the
fundamental justice it owes to its client groups, the same groups
whose equality claims are enshrined in the Charter. Similar
disillusionment may set in with social assistance programs, public
schools, and health care systems. And not without reason: such
programs and agencies are statistically likely to perform below
expectations, to resort to expedient but unprincipled measures, and
sooner or later, therefore, to become candidates for Charter scrutiny
and litigation.
One arena in which this pattern has manifested itself is the
processing of immigrants and refugees, although in this instance
Charter litigation features as root cause rather than inevitable result.
The prospects for people attempting to immigrate to Canada may
experienced a drop from 2,002 cases in 1980-1981 to 1,409 by 1996-1997).
The federal commission's caseload increased from 447 to 2,025 during this
time. Early commission work focussed almost exclusively on race-related
discrimination; the advent of legislated protection against sex discrimination
meant that by 1995-1996 the majority of claims dealt with by Ontario's
commission were gender-related (27 percent, compared to 23 percent for race-
related complaints). Ibid. at 71-73.
239 The workload of the Ontario Human Rights Commission provides a case in
point: the number of educational initiatives initiated by the Commission stood
at 1,725 in 1980-1981; by 1990-1991, it had dropped to a mere 332. While
other provincial commissions may not reflect a similar decline, at their highest
points, the British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba commissions
undertook nowhere near a comparable number ofprograms. British Columbia,
for instance, began with fifty-two programs and by 1990-199 1, though it had
nearly quadrupled its efforts to 200, still offered less than one-eighth the
number in Ontario a decade earlier. Howe & Johnson, ibid. at 74.
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actually have worsened due to the well-intentioned decision by the
Supreme Court in Singh,24" which held that the Charter applied to all
claims processed within Canada. Michael Mandel notes that the rate
of successful refugee claims rose from 33 percent in 1985 - before
Singh - to 76 percent in 1989, but then dropped to 48 percent in
1993 through a combination of "compassion fatigue" and changes
to immigration policy. 4' It is easy enough to explain this ebb and
flow. The government responded with measures designed to force
claimants to obtain entrance visas abroad - beyond the reach of the
Charter - where immigration officials cannot be challenged even if
they make "arbitrary and capricious" choices with "no semblance of
due process.242 Meanwhile, the Charter presents no obstacle to
government raising immigration standards, requiring higher levels
of education ,and reducing its target intake for UN Convention
refugees in order to accommodate a higher proportion of business
240 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1985], 17
D.L.R. (4th) 422 (S.C.C.) [Singh].
241 Mandel, supra note 6 at 252-53.
242 Ibid. at 254. A task force of the Canadian Council for Refugees reported
numerous problems and noted that "failings are institutional, endemic,
structural. The problems will not go away until the system itself changes." In
a 1996 survey of problems at Canada's visa posts the Council noted the
difficulties in even obtaining a clear picture of Canada's refugee intake
process:
The very fact that the posts are overseas means that they cannot be
subject to the close scrutiny afforded to in-Canada processes. The
information is scattered around the world. Refugees, because of their
vulnerability, are among those least likely to lodge complaints.
Those who are accepted and resettle in Canada are on balance likely
to have had better experiences than those who were rejected, whose
complaints, if they have them, will probably never reach the NGOs.
This survey reported concerns that access to some posts was "severely
limited," that decisions taken by immigration officials "appear to be arbitrary,"
and that "treatment of refugees i: sometimes biased by considerations such as
their colour, their wealth or their professional or educational background."
Canadian Council for Refugees, "State of Refugees in Canada" online:
Canadian Council for Refugees <http://www.web.net/-ccr/state.
html#Introduction> [Canadian Council for Refugees, "State of Refugees in
Canada"].
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immigrants within its overall annual goals.243 Moreover, recent
figures suggest that even refugees who reach Canada are often
denied the procedural rights supposedly guaranteed by Singh. A
report by the Canadian Council for Refugees notes Canada's
participation in a "disturbing international trend" in the increase in
detention of refugees. 2" There are early indications that treatment of
243 Mandel, supra note 6 at 255. Absolute numbers have fluctuated over the past
two decades - the total immigration in 1982 stood at 121,330, peaked at
256,757 (in 1993), and stood at 222,411 at 2001. However, the percentage of
refugee immigration dropped from 20.1 percent in 1985 to a record low of 8.3
percent in 1994, rebounding slightly by the end of the decade to rest at 12.5
percent by 2001. Canadian Council for Refugees, "Immigration to Canada,
1979-2001," online: <http://www.web.ca/-ccr/immstats.html>. Canadian
refugee intake through the mid-1990s also reflected a European bias, with
European refugees constituting the largest percentage of those resettled in
Canada from 1993 to 1996, at rates that consistently outstripped the European
share of the word's refugee population. This bias came at the expense of
refugees from Africa and especially the Middle East, groups consistently
under-represented in Canada's resettlement program. The Canadian Council
for Refugees notes that this disproportion was due in part to the efforts to
resettle refugees from the former Yugoslavia but was "also likely a result in
part of the greater concentration of Canadian visa offices and staff in Europe
than in other regions of the world." Ibid. The former explanation could
possibly account for the fact that Europeans constituted 51.5 percent of
refugees resettled in Canada in 1994, at a time when the United Nations
assessed the European proportion of global refugee resettlement need at 40.1
percent, and possibly also the fact that in 1995 those figures were 62.5 percent
and 38.5 percent, respectively; nevertheless, it fails to explain the extreme
discrepancy in 1993, when Canada's resettlement was 26.3 percent European
while the proportional need for European resettlement stood at just 0.28
percent. In that year, Canada resettled over 3,000 European refugees when the
U.N. recognized the need for only 200 European resettlements worldwide.
Canadian Council for Refugees, "Refugees Worldwide, Assessment of Global
Resettlement Needs and Resettlement in Canada: Statistical Overview 1993-
1996" (February 1997), online: <http://www.web.net/%7Eccr/statl.htm#
cont>.
244 Detainees under Canadian law may be held on grounds that they present a risk
of flight or a danger to the public, or because their identity is in question. The
Council notes that the effect of the replacement of the 1978 Immigration Act
with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in 2002 on detention rates
is not yet ascertainable. Canadian Council for Refugees, "State of Refugees
in Canada." Supra note 242. While the average number of days a refugee was
detained in Canada fluctuated wildly and stood lower in 2000-2001 than it had
in 1996-1997 (a drop from just over twenty-one days to just under twenty-one
days), the total number of days detained jumped from 138,481 in 1996-1997
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this sort will become increasingly common in Canada as a result of
policies prompted by new anti-terrorism initiatives.245
The second hypothesis builds on the first. Not only is it the fate
of public agencies to fall short of expectations, but that fate has been
hastened and made more certain by neo-liberalism. As neo-liberal
policies have reduced public revenues and expenditures, and as neo-
liberal politicians have disparaged the programs on which public
funds were expended (and by implication their intended
beneficiaries), the behaviour of those who deliver such programs has
altered. Fewer resources are available to respond to needs, fewer
officials are available to adjudicate claims, fewer clients are content
with either outcomes or the procedures by which they are reached,
and fewer recognitions or rewards flow to civil servants who are
faithful proponents of now-unpopular policies.246 In these more
to peak at 224,423 in 1999-2000. Most troubling of all was the steady climb
in the number of persons detained from 6,401 in 1996-1997 to 9,148 in 2000-
2001 - nearly a 50 percent increase over five years. Canadian Council for
Refugees, "Detention Statistics" (undated), online: <http://www.web.net/
-ccr/Detention Statistics.htm>.
245 ICLMG, supra note 234 at 9.
246 The case of human rights commissions is instructive in respect of the two
hypotheses discussed in this section. As early as 1977 the Ontario commission
was bemoaning a lack of sufficient funds to address the doubling of its
caseload, a tripling of its community relations programs, an increase in the
complexity of discrimination cases, and the resulting increased legal costs this
entailed. Funding for the federal commission decreased by 8 percent in 1993
and a further 9 percent in 1997; for provincial commissions, the decline began
in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s, with only Ontario, Qu6bec, and
Prince Edward Island seeing a temporary increase in the late 1980s (followed
by a protracted decline over the early-to-mid-1990s). Howe & Johnson, supra
note 238 at 76-79. Howe and Johnson explain the impact of the fiscal restraint
which characterized the Charter era on the operations of the commissions:
Common problems were these: inadequate commission staff due to
hiring freezes or lay-offs; increased delays in responding to formal
complaints; case backlogs; and difficulty carrying out new
responsibilities in areas such as affirmative action, race relations, and
systemic discrimination. These problems led to sluggish human
rights operations and to the symbolic (rather than substantive)
treatment of rights. They also lead to rising criticism by human rights
advocates, minority groups, and even the officials of the underfunded
commissions. These criticisms were reported periodically in the
media, in the academic literature, and in Auditor General reports,
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stressful conditions, we hypothesize, humane instincts are dulled,
civil behaviour becomes more difficult to sustain, and systems tend
to fail. By all accounts today, being a student in a school or
university, a patient in a hospital, an arriving passenger under
interrogation by an immigration office, or a welfare recipient
seeking housing or a subsistence allowance is a more difficult, and
sometimes more demeaning, experience than it used to be in the
immediate pre-Charter years.247 In strict Charter terms, perhaps,
discretionary entitlements or privileges are being diminished in all
these examples, not "rights." But those who experience abusive
encounters with state officials and agencies are unlikely to make
such subtle distinctions.
While data are not available to test either of these hypotheses, it
seems highly improbable that the Charter has improved the quality
of "fundamental justice" experienced by millions of ordinary
citizens who are exposed on a daily basis to the risk of casual,
personal, and systemic abuse by state bureaucracies.
VI. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL PLURALISM
One of the ambitions of the Charter was to reinforce and enhance
interest group briefs, and legal cases.
Ibid. at 79. Recall, also, the disappointment expressed by feminist scholars
with respect to the pace of women's progress in the Charter period. Supra
note 118.
247 Here again, the example of human rights is revealing. A "report card"
distributed in 1997 to stakeholders including "equality-seeking groups and
advocacy organizations," "employer organizations and business groups," and
"human rights officials and commissions staff" rated the commissions
according to criteria including accessibility, promptness, objectivity, fair
procedures, and compensation. Nearly all provincial commissions received an
overall grade of"C." Those remaining - the Ontario, Manitoba, and federal
commissions - all scored a "D." Survey responses from equality-seeking and
advocacy groups (which sponsor individual human rights complainants, who
are the commissions' clientele) yielded the following generalizations:
"commission staff are highly complacent, a result of decreased morale. ...
Human rights staff are too willing to screen out 'trivial' cases, and when they
do accept complaints, they too often give them inadequate attention and
investigation. Human rights officers try too hard to discourage complainants
from initiating complaints and, once initiated, from continuing on with them."
Howe & Johnson, ibid. at 138-43.
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the democratic character of Canadian society through the protection
of both political freedoms and cultural and social expression. It is
extremely difficult to provide an empirical foundation for qualitative
assessments in either area. However, we will provide at least some
suggestive evidence.
It at least seems clear that if greater political freedom exists in
Canada following adoption of the Charter, fewer Canadians wish
to avail themselves of it. Voter participation in federal elections -
the crudest measure of the health of our political democracy - fell
from 76 percent in 1979 to 61 percent in 2000,248 and marginally
again to 60.5 percent in 2004.249 Turnout at the provincial level
shows no decisive trend but certainly evidences no Charter-inspired
frenzy to participate.2 50 Increased abstention from voting seems to
correlate closely with diminished confidence in or respect for
politics and politicians. 5 ' Thus, while in 1968, only 26 percent of
248 Centre for Research and Information on Canada, Voter Participation in
Canada: Is Canadian Democracy in Crisis? (2001), online:
<http://www.cric.ca/pdf/cahiers/cricpapersnov2001 .pdf> at 4 [CRIC, Voter
Participation]. This study notes that turnout in other democratic countries has
similarly declined; for example, participation in the United Kingdom's 2001
election was lower than in Canada's 2000 federal contest. Turnout in the
United States "has not changed much over the last 30 years, but it was already
very low to begin with." Ibid. at 6. One commentator summarizes Canada's
performance as "near the bottom of the industrialized-world turnout league
tables.... Canada has never had a peculiarly high turnout, but the gradual
decline from the 1960s to the 1980s, followed by the precipitate drop in the
1990s, has taken us from the lower middle of the pack to near the very back."
Richard Johnston, "Canadian Elections at the Millennium," Choices 6:6
(September 2000) at 13, cited in CRIC, Voter Participation, ibid. at 6.
249 Linda McKay-Panos, "Right to Vote" (2004) 29:2 Law Now 38 at 38.
250 A 2001 study comparing election results from the 1980-1989 period to the
1990-2001 period reveals that "turnout has declined in five provinces, risen
in three provinces, and remained unchanged on two. ... Where turnout has
increased, the size of the increase has been relatively small .... Average
turnout has not changed significantly in Ontario or Alberta, but the level of
participation in those provinces (respectively, 58 percent and 53 percent at the
most recent elections) nonetheless is very low." CRIC, Voter Participation,
supra note 248 at 5.
251 Interestingly, public confidence in the House of Commons has become less
polarized, while confidence in political parties has become far more so. In
1979, 38 percent of respondents had a "a great deal" of confidence in the
House while only 15 percent had "very little"; by 2001, these numbers stood
at 24 percent and 26 percent respectively. Political parties commanded "a
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Canadians believed that government leaders were "crooked," by
1997 the number had more than doubled to 55 percent.252 In 1968,
51 percent were prepared to say that the national government cared
what they thought; by 2001 that number had fallen to 27 percent.
25 3
In 1997, only 18 percent of university students expressed a
preference to work in the federal public service, while 64.8 percent
were focussed on the private sector.254 The Charter has apparently
failed to immunize Canadians against a growing tendency in liberal
democracies to treat public processes and institutions with
indifference.255
On the other hand, in certain respects, over the past two decades
Canadian political life has become more inclusive and more
great deal" of confidence from 30 percent of respondents and "very little"
from 22 percent in 1979; by 2001, these figures stood at 13 and 39 percent.
Ibid. at 16.
252 "Canadian Public Opinion on Representative Democracy," online: Canadian
Public Opinion Research Archive, Queen's University
<http :/www.queensu.ca/cora/trends/tables/attitudestowardrepresentative_
institutions.ppt> at Figure 3. Also see Centre for Research and Information
on Canada, "Citizen Participation and Canadian Democracy: An Overview,"
online: <http://www.cric.ca/pwpre/cric-studies/citizenparticipationand_
cdndemocracyaug_2003.ppt>. Somewhat perversely, confidence levels in
politicians have rebounded somewhat since 1992 (with 48 percent of
Canadians expressing "a great deal or some confidence" in political leaders
in 2004, compared to 42 percent in 2002 and 19 percent in 1992), while belief
in the honesty or ethics of these same leaders remains low (currently hovering
at 23 percent, up 2 percent from 2002). CRIC, "Canadians More Confident,"
supra note 160.
253 CRIC, Voter Participation, supra note 248 at 15.
254 When asked their opinions specifically about the federal public service, the
largest percentage of respondents either "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that it:
"Has too much bureaucracy," "Is resistant to change," "Is too political," "Is
too rules and process oriented," and "Is constantly downsizing." Jennifer L.
Smith & Susan Snider, Facing the Challenge: Recruiting the Next Generation
of University Graduates to the Public Service (Ottawa: Public Service
Commission of Canada, 1998) at 82-84.
255 See Robert D. Putnam, Susan J. Pharr & Russell J. Dalton, "Introduction:
What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?" in Susan J. Pharr & Robert D.
Putnam, eds., Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral
Democracies? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) 3 at 13-21
[Putnam, Pharr & Dalton]. Some essays in this book provide comparative data
for Canada.
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representative of Canada's diversity25 and, in that sense, more
democratic. However, to put this claim in perspective, when
Canada's progress can be measured against that of other countries
- notably in regard to the participation of women - Canada still lags
well behind relevant comparators, as noted above.25
In terms of changes in the concentration of political power during
the Charter era, the picture is mixed. The federal Conservatives
governed with significant majorities from 1984 to 1993, and the
Liberals with similar majorities from 1993 to 2004 before slipping
to a minority position in that year. Indeed, from the 1970s onward,
the trend seemed to be towards greater concentration of electoral
power. In 1979 and 1980, the winning parties - first the
Conservatives, then the Liberals - achieved 36 percent and 44
percent of the popular vote, respectively, and held 48 percent and 52
percent of the seats in the House. However, in 1984 and 1988, the
winning Conservatives received 50 percent and 43 percent of the
votes and held 75 percent and 57 percent of the seats. From 1993 to
2000 (including the intervening election of 1997) the dominant
Liberals remained constant at about 41 percent of the vote, while
their share of seats decreased from 67 percent to 57 percent. In part,
however, the apparently impregnable parliamentary majorities of the
governing party resulted from the emergence of deep fault lines
within the Canadian political system. Thus, whereas the
Conservatives in the 1980s shared the ballot with only two other
significant contenders,258 the Liberals faced four serious opponents
in each of the subsequent elections from 1993 to 2000. The
fracturing of opposition support allowed the Liberals to maintain
their parliamentary dominance 59 until 2004, when the Conservative
Party of Canada (a merger of the Canadian Alliance and the
256 Ibid. at 46-47.
215 Ibid. at 36-37.
258 The Liberals and NDP each won in a significant number of ridings. The Social
Credit Party and myriad smaller parties failed to secure a single seat.
Information and Documentation Branch Library of Parliament, "Electoral
Results by Party: 1867 to Date" (31 August 2004), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/process/house/asp/PartyElect.
asp?Language=E>.
29 The Progressive Conservatives, NDP, Bloc Qurbecois, and Reform Party
(reincarnated as the Canadian Alliance for 2000) competed in these three
elections; the best showing for any one party was that of the Alliance in 2000,
with 22 percent of seats. Ibid.
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Progressive Conservatives) won sufficient votes and seats to reduce
the Liberals to minority status.
At the provincial level, the evidence is likewise mixed. To
mention only the largest provinces, Ontario - after forty-three years
of Conservative rule - experienced four changes of government
involving three different parties in six elections between 1985 and
2003, arguably a sign of a healthy democracy. British Columbia
changed governments twice between 1989 and 2001, as did Quebec
between 1989 and 2002. However, Alberta from 1971 to the present
has been governed by the same party, which has never been
seriously challenged during the entire period. Overall, then, our
political culture seems to have become, at different moments and in
different places, both more and less robust in the years following the
introduction of the Charter- an ambiguous conclusion that suggests
that the Charter itself may not have figured largely in the outcome.
On the other hand, at particular moments, the Charter itself has
provoked political controversy and, to that extent, may have affected
the outcome of elections. One example would be the adoption of the
Charter itself, as part of the controversy over patriation of the
Constitution, which animated the forces of Quebec nationalism and
arguably helped to produce the Conservative victory of 1984.260
Another would be the controversy over gay and lesbian marriage
that featured in the 2004 campaign, most notoriously when the
former Conservative justice critic provoked a backlash against his
party by urging invocation of the "notwithstanding clause" to roll
back legislative gains made by gays and lesbians that conservatives
regard as examples of the Charter being "used as the crutch to carry
forward all of the issues that social libertarians want [sic]."2 6'
Of course, changes in government do not necessarily produce
significant changes in policy. A healthy society, it is said, is a
quarrelling society. Has the Charter helped to make Canadian
society more quarrelsome? Public opinion polls suggest that there
260 The "betrayal" of Quebec by Canada and the other provinces spurred Quebec
Premier Ren6 Lvesque to publicly endorse Mulroney, and it caused the Parti
Qurbrcois to shelve its separatist agenda and devote its resources and political
capital to Mulroney's campaign. John F. Conway, Debts to Pay: English
Canada and Quibec from the Conquest to the Referendum (Toronto: James
Lorimer & Company Publishers, 1992) at 126.
261 Campbell Clark, Brian Laghi & Steven Chase "Leaders' Last Push for Power"
The Globe and Mail (26 June 2004) Al.
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have indeed been significant shifts in public opinion on key issues
over time: on whether the health care system works, on immigration
and race relations, on whether taxes are too high, and on whether
Canada's relations with the United States are too friendly or
antagonistic. One would hope that these shifts were the result of
open debate not only within the political class but among ordinary
citizens. However, the ability of ordinary citizens to reach informed
opinions is very much a function of the diversity of sources of
information and perspectives available to them. In this respect,
pluralism has suffered a distinct setback in Canada, as a result of
growing concentration of media ownership.262 Content analyses of
media reporting on important issues suggest that this concentration
has indeed narrowed the spectrum of political and social views
available to Canadians.263
262 One observer described the situation with respect to print media in 2002:
"From the pre-World War One period, when 138 publishers ran 138 dailies,
in Canada, we have reached a situation where the largest chain currently has
34% of the national readership, five media companies cover 83% of the
national circulation, and the five remaining independent owners account for
less than 2%." In a trend that mirrors the situation in the United States,
"'[o]nly eight English markets in Canada support more than one daily
newspaper, and in a couple of these, one chain owns both papers." Enn
Raudsepp, "The Daily Newspaper Industry under the Microscope:
Monopolies, Concentration, Conglomeration and Convergence" (June 2002)
Canadian Issues 25 at 26 [Raudsepp]. The statistics are comparable for
broadcasting, for which "[the] top five ownership groups owned 68% of all
television stations in 2000, up from 28.6% in 1970. . . .[S]ingle-station
ownership was far less common in 2000, with just six such entities." Canada,
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, Our Cultural
Sovereignty: The Second Century of Canadian Broadcasting (Ottawa:
Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 2003) at 393 (Chair: Clifford
Lincoln) [Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage].
263 Current levels of concentration mean that the role of daily newspapers in
"establishing the public agenda and providing a forum for vigorous public
debate" has "steadily diminished, and the voices that are left tend to represent
an increasingly homogenous perspective on social, economic and political
affairs-that of the business class." Raudsepp, ibid. at 26. Speaking at a recent
conference on the subject, Raudsepp cited a study revealing that 75 percent of
news stories in Canadian papers consisted of coverage of "canned event[s]"
such as press conferences rather than reporter-originated stories. "Journalists
Question Media Ownership in Canada" The Dominion (10 November 2003),
online: The Dominion <http://dominionpaper.ca/accounts/2003/11/10/
journalist.html>. The problem of concentration has attracted government's
concern throughout the Charter era: see e.g., Canada, Task Force on
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Ironically, the Charter - far from ensuring a broader diversity of
media perspectives - has been invoked to protect or reinforce
growing media consolidation and growing corporate financial
influence within the political process. Appellate courts have
impeded or struck down attempts to apply competition laws to
media companies,264 limit campaign expenditures by well-financed
single-issue lobbies," 5 regulate the dissemination of polling results
Broadcasting Policy, et al., Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986). A more recent
government committee report summarizes its experience with this issue: "a
variety of witnesses expressed concern that the concentration of media under
a small number of ownership groups will pose a threat to the democratic
process by reducing access to a diverse range of different views and opinions.
Witnesses expressing this view would like to see restriction on the
concentration of ownership to prevent the possibility of having just one voice
in particular contexts." Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, ibid. at
393. While media executives were quick to assure the Committee that
consolidated media ownership has not reduced the diversity of opinions,
leading academics were quick to disagree. Professor Marc-Frangois Bernier
argued that "[c]onvergence, or to put it another way, concentration, generally
creates - and this has been borne out by several studies - a form of growing
pressure to make content compatible with the businesses plans of the
conglomerates." Ibid. at 400. Professor John Miller of Ryerson University was
more emphatic:
Are there more reporters covering the news now than there were ten
years ago? I guarantee you there are not. Are their owners able to
vote for you? Do they live in town or thousands of miles away? Can
you talk to them on Main Street? No, you cannot. These papers are
owned by six giant media companies, some with interests in
television, radio, filmmaking, and the Internet. These are papers
whose owners' first loyalty is not to readers but to shareholders, who
view the delivery of news and information as contributing nothing to
the revenue side of their ledgers, just to their overhead. Ibid.
The now-infamous editorial policy of the Asper family-controlled CanWest
Global media company and the events leading to the dismissal of publisher
Russell Mills provide eloquent support for these observers' worst fears; see
e.g., Katherine Macklem, "Can the Aspers Do It?" Maclean's 115:14 (8 April
2002) 48; and Russell Mills, "Democracy, the Media, and a Fired Publisher"
(2002) 16:2 Canadian Speeches 8.
264 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
265 Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), (1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, in which the
Court struck down a third-party meeting expense limit in Quebec's
Referendum Act. The Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 was drafted to
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and advertising that might distort voting patterns,266 and forbid
commercial advertising that undercuts important public policies.2 67
By contrast, on other issues much more central to the process - for
example, on the question of widely discrepant constituency sizes
favouring rural voters - they have refused to intervene.2 6' To be fair,
however, while the courts have been relatively insensitive to the
power of corporations and privileged electorates to exercise undue
influence over public opinion and public policy, they have been
willing to create space for countervailing political forces more
dependent on shoe-string resources and grassroots strategies. For
example, they have prevented de-registration and de-funding of
fringe political parties,2 69 permitted the dissemination of political
literature in airports27 and on utility poles,27" ' and protected
conform with the dicta in Libman by providing for higher third-party spending
limits in federal elections. These limits were struck down in Harper v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2002] A.J. No. 1542 and Canada (Elections Canada) v.
National Citizen's Coalition, [2003] O.J. No. 3939. Leave to appeal the ruling
in Harper was granted: Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003]
S.C.C.A. No. 76 [Harper]; the Supreme Court reserved judgment on 10
February 2004. Allison Dunfield, "Judgment Reserved in Gag Law Case" The
Globe and Mail (10 February 2004), online: <http://www.globeandmail.com/
servlet/story/RTGAM.200402 1 O.wharp02 10/BNStory/National/>. In a deci-
sion on 18 May 2004, the Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions
of the act were constitutional.
266 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877;
Harper, ibid. The Charter's potential for interference in this regard was
clearly demonstrated in the recent federal election. In R. v. Bryan (2003) 233
D.L.R. (4th) 745 (B.C.S.C), the Charter's freedom of expression provisions
were used to strike down prohibitions in the federal Election Act on the
premature broadcasting of election results in electoral districts where polls
have not yet closed. Elections Canada then announced that the court's
decision would be applied across Canada for this election, presumably in
acknowledgement that they had greatest salience in British Columbia.
Elections Canada, News Release, "Chief Electoral Officer Announces Policy
on Application of British Columbia Supreme Court Decision" (10 June 2004),
online: <http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section=med&document =
juni 004&dir-pre&lang=e&textonly=false>.
267 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
25 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158.
See generally Rainer Knopff& F. L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough:
Nelson Canada, 1992) at c. 12.
269 Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37.
270 Committeefor the Commonwealth ofCanada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139.
271 Ramsden v. Peterborough, [1993] 2 S.C.R 1084.
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"leafleting" by social movements and trade unions as freedom of
expression.272 However, these protections have been rather tentative
and somewhat peripheral to the mainstream of political
developments. It remains to be seen whether they are sufficient to
ensure the survival and intensification of vigorous public debate on
a wide range of controversial topics.
To sum up, there clearly have been genuine debates since 1982
over many fundamental and controversial political issues - Quebec
secession, western alienation, free trade, the welfare state, and the
Charter itself. However, a significant body of popular and expert
opinion holds that Canada's political culture today is less vibrant,
less democratic, than it was a generation ago.273
Political culture, however, does not exist in isolation from the
272 United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1518 (U.F.C. W.) v. Kmart
Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083; Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] 1
S.C.R. 156.
273 Various causes have been cited for this malaise including: legalization of the
politics of both the left and the right under the Charter, whose net effect has
been a growing democratic deficit and whose "chief political beneficiary is a
quasi-one-party government in Ottawa" (Reg Whitaker, "The Flight from
Politics" (2002):1 1 Inroads 187; the disappearance of the three-party
"hegemony" in federal politics and the resulting fragmented and regionalized
party system (and electorate), which tends to "rob general elections of their
capacity to act as great collective decision-making events" (R. Kenneth Carty,
William Cross & Lisa Young, "Canadian Party Politics in the New Century"
(2001) 35:4 J. of Canadian Studies 23 at 36); the alarming concentration of
power in the office of the Prime Minister (see e.g., Donald J. Savoie,
Governingfrom the Centre: The Concentration ofPower in Canadian Politics
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Herman Bakvis, "Prime
Minister and Cabinet in Canada: An Autocracy in Need of Reform?" 35:4 J.
of Canadian Studies 60); and the threat posed by growing voter cynicism and
indifference (see e.g., Hugh Segal, "Lack of Legitimacy Threatens Democratic
Governance" (2003) 17:2 Canadian Speeches 7; Therese Arseneau, Robert M
Campbell & A Brian Tanguay, "Reforming Canada's Political Institutions for
the Twenty-First Century" (2001) 35:4 J. of Canadian Studies 5; Guy Saint-
Pierre, "Public and Politicians Urged to Halt Degeneration of Democracy"
(2002) 16:1 Canadian Speeches 21; William Cross & Lisa Young, "Party
Democracy Ten Years After Charlottetown" (November 2002) Canadian
Issues 10; and John Graham, "Reinvigorating Democracy: Dealing with
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civil society in which it is bred. As we have already suggested, in
some respects the changes in civil society that it was hoped that the
Charter would engender have not materialized. The plight of
Aboriginal peoples has not been much ameliorated, if at all. The
project of multiculturalism, which is mentioned but not given
prominence in the Charter, has seemingly gone off the boil.
Immigrants - despite new guarantees of their legal and equality
rights - seem to be having a tougher time integrating into society
and the economy.
Nonetheless, by many measures, Canadian society remains quite
tolerant - indeed, surprisingly so given the cultural dominance of its
powerful neighbour, the United States. Surveys show repeatedly that
on a number of controversial social issues, Canadian public opinion
- and on many issues, Canadian law - remains far more
progressive.274 One might have expected the opposite, given that the
United States has had for much longer than Canada its own well-
entrenched Bill of Rights, a tradition of waging political and social
controversy by means of constitutional litigation, an activist court -
and until fairly recently, a liberal one - and an influential, rights-
conscious legal academy. Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that
constitutional Bills of Rights do not transform public attitudes and
legislative performance as much as the authors of the Charter
imagined.
VII. CONCLUSION
Acknowledging the shortcomings of our methodology and the
limitations of our evidence, and acknowledging that our conclusions
are necessarily qualified by the presence of exceptions and counter-
examples, our evidence still shows that in many respects the Charter
era has been a disappointment. The years since 1982 have not
witnessed much progress towards equal dignity and life-chances for
members of many marginalized communities, more positive
encounters by ordinary citizens with the state and its agents, or the
emergence of a more vibrant civic and political culture. When
Canada's experience is measured against that of some European
countries with no comparable document, those countries often
appear to have made equal or superior progress towards realizing the
274 Michael Adams, Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of
Converging Values (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003).
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values articulated in the Charter. When it is measured against that
of the United States, which has a much lengthier and more intense
experience with its Charter-equivalent - the Bill of Rights -
equality, due process, and political freedoms seem in many respects
to be more secure here than there.
It would be fair to propose, then, that other factors must explain
recent changes in Canadian society, culture, and politics. If not the
Charter, what then?
Political economy, above all. As our data generally suggest, if
one were to establish a gradient that descends from the most affluent
to the least affluent members of society, one would find at each
point on that gradient not only lower living standards, but lower
levels of educational attainment, health, personal safety and security,
civic participation, political influence, and respect from police and
other state officials. Moreover, as one descended the gradient, one
would almost certainly encounter members of Charter-protected
groups in ever-increasing numbers. Certainly disproportionate
numbers of people of colour, Aboriginal peoples, women, and
disabled people are to be found at the lower end of the gradient,
though perhaps not immigrants, gays or lesbians. The best prospects
for greater progress towards the equality values of the Charter
would therefore be to redistribute wealth. And not just towards
equality values: towards legal rights, political rights, associational
rights, and perhaps language rights as well. However, most available
studies suggest that throughout the Charter era, economic inequality
in Canada has been growing rather than diminishing,275 especially as
successive governments have reduced social services and other
transfer payments to the poor27 and reconfigured the tax system so
to reduce its redistributive effects.277 If our hypothesis is correct, this
275 See Marc Frenette, David Green & Garnett Picot, "Rising Income Inequality
Amid the Economic Recovery of the 1990s: An Exploration of Three Data
Sources" (Ottawa: Analytical Studies Research Division, Statistics Canada,
Working Paper 219, 2004).
276 See e.g., Ann Curry-Stevens, When Markets Fail People: Exploring the
Widening Gap between Rich and Poor in Canada (Toronto: Centre for Social
Justice Foundation for Research and Education, 2001).
277 See e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Michael Veall, "The Evolution of High Incomes
in Canada, 1920-2000" (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper 9607, 2003). Saez and Veall show that from 1990 to 2000, the
top 1 percent of Canadian taxpayers increased their share of all income from
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might explain why the Charter has failed to achieve many of its
ambitions.
Of course, the Charter was not designed to transform Canada's
political economy. On the contrary, when it was adopted, its
architects took considerable care neither to protect property nor to
redistribute wealth."' An attempt in the early 1990s to complement
the Charter ofRights and Freedoms with a so-called Social Charter
might have overcome this limitation, but that attempt ultimately
failed." 9 So have occasional attempts to persuade courts to read
9.3 to 13.6 percent, while the top 10 percent increased its share during the
same period from 35.5 to 42.3 percent.
278 As Patrick Monahan notes, the Supreme Court of Canada established in Irwin
Toy v. Qudbec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, that "economic rights are generally not
protected by the Charter"; this interpretation relied on the fact that the
Charter's drafters had consciously omitted protection for property rights under
s. 7 despite a proposal supporting its inclusion that was ultimately rejected by
the Trudeau government. This has led to a judicial deference to governments
in designing economic and social welfare policy that has immunized it from
s. 15 equality challenges (as in McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 229 and Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[ 1999] 1 S.C.R. 497) except in cases of "compelling justification for judicial
intervention" (as in M. v. H., supra note 200, where an Ontario law that
excluded homosexuals from eligibility for benefits was struck down). Patrick
Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at 396-97,
nn. 31, 34. Further, Michael Mandel observes:
[T]he Charter implicitly removes questions of economic power from
the scope ofjudicial review by consigning them to a purely hortatory
part of the constitution. Part III, entitled "Equalization and Regional
Disparities," claims that Canadian governments "are committed to"
the following egalitarian ideals: (a) promoting equal opportunities for
the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering economic development
to reduce disparity in opportunities; and c) providing essential public
services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. But these
commitments are prefaced by the disclaimer that they do not in any
way alter the legislative authority or powers of any government,
which ensures that no court will take the government to task for
failing to live up to them.
Mandel, supra note 6 at 341-42.
279 Proposed by the Ontario NDP government during the negotiations that
produced the ill-fated Charlottetown Accord, the Social Charter was dismissed
even by sympathetic commentators as unlikely to produce positive outcomes.
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economic equality into the Charter.28°
This is not an argument for amending the Charter to create a right
of equal access to public goods, or to prevent poor and working
See e.g., Mandel, supra note 6 at 109-114; Bakan & Schneiderman, supra
note 23. Joel Bakan argues:
[T]he very idea of a social charter or union is flawed, and that, in any
of its proposed forms, it is unlikely to do what those who support it
want it to do. This is because social rights, as they are articulated in
social charter proposals, are too vague to guarantee anything of
substance, do not touch the complicated causes of poverty and
disadvantage, and their symbolic message is at best ambiguous.
Bakan, "Social Rights," supra note 23 at 86. Hester Lessard offers similar
criticism: "[A] social charter can also be viewed as leaving the existing map
of power-no power in place, and, by giving political and moral authority to
that map, making us feel good about a social landscape that would recognize
the most needy in our political economy without actually reworking the
topography." Hester Lessard, "Creation Stories: Social Rights and Canada's
Social Contract," in Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note 23, 101 at 102.
280 Recent unsuccessful attempts to use the Charter to force governments to
change their social spending priorities include: Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of
Community an Social Services), [1996] S.C.C.A No. 373 (Ontario has no
positive duty to provide welfare assistance); Gosselin v. Quibec (Attorney
General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 2002 SCC 84 (Qu6bec social assistance regime
does not violate the Charter regulation by providing lower level of benefits for
persons under thirty year of age); Auton (Guardian ad litem ol) v. British
Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (British
Columbia has no duty to fund or provide a particular therapy for autistic
children); and Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and
LabradorAssociation ofPublic and Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), 2004 SCC
66, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (Newfoundland can delay implementation of its pay
equity legislation because of financial exigency). As Gwen Brodsky notes,
attempts at winning economic equality through Charter have been frustrated
by:
(1) governments' unwillingness to undertake progressive law reforms
voluntarily, (2) lack of access by poor people to the resources
necessary to engage in the litigation process, (3) regressive, anti-
egalitarian positions advanced in the courts by governments, and (4)
judicial insensitivity to the problems of group disadvantage.
Gwen Brodsky, "Social Charter Issues" in Bakan & Schneiderman, supra
note 23, 43 at 51-52.
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class Canadians from suffering the legal, social, or political
disabilities associated with economic deprivation (though ironically
Prime Minister Trudeau - as an academic - had proposed precisely
such provisions).2"' In the first place, there is no evidence that such
constitutional provisions would accomplish very much. After all,
relatively poor countries such as India and South Africa, which have
constitutionalized social and economic rights, have been unable to
redistribute wealth or power even with the help of an activist
judiciary, while other, more affluent, countries such as the
Netherlands and Sweden have become more egalitarian unaided by
constitutional prescriptions. And secondly, we share the belief of
other Charter agnostics that it may be unwise to place much faith in
transformative strategies that depend primarily on judges and
lawyers. Their institutional arrangements, their ideological
predispositions, their intellectual formation, and their professional
identification with affluent clients and powerful state interests make
it unlikely that they can or will function effectively as change
agents.
Political economy, then, above all, but not political economy
alone: geo-political forces increasingly determine the inclination and
capacity of states to make good on what their constitutions proclaim
and their legislators promise.2"2 Culture defines their vision of the
right and the relevant; technology realigns relationships and
redistributes comparative advantage; demography produces tectonic
shifts in the needs, entitlements, and behaviours of key
constituencies; and natural endowments and catastrophes cause the
fortunes of local populations to rise and fall.
These forces, and countless others, have changed Canada
considerably during the Charter era. But to what extent have they in
turn been reinforced, retarded, redirected, or pre-empted by the
Charter? As Charter agnostics, we argue that the burden of
281 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Economic Rights" (1961-1962) 8 McGill Law J. 121.
282 Robert Putnam describes a general decline in the "capacity of political agents
to act on citizens' interests and desires," largely due to increasing
globalization - he uses the term "internationalization" - which "creates a
growing incongruence between the scope of territorial units and the issues
raised by interdependence, reducing the output effectiveness of democratic
nation-states" and has "undermined the ability of national governments to
implement their chosen policies and respond to citizen demands in a
satisfactory way." Putnam, Pharr & Dalton, supra note 255 at 25 [emphasis
in original].
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demonstrating its power and influence falls on those who hold that
view. In our view, the available evidence suggests, at a minimum,
that the Charter has mattered less than was hoped and expected by
its authors and those who live on its avails; less than is claimed by
those who fear that it has done too much or too little or the wrong
things; and less than imagined by true believers of all persuasions
who do not wish to have their hopes, fears, or opinions challenged
by even the modest evidence we have been able to deploy.
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